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Civil Procedure
Civil Procedure; claim and delivery
Code of Civil Procedure Chapter 2 (commencing with §509) (repealed); Chapter 2 (commencing with §509) (new).
AB 1623 (Warren); STATS 1972, Ch 855
(Effective August 14, 1972)
AB 2294 (Warren); STATS 1972, Ch 1324
(Effective December 22, 1972)
In Blair v. Pitchess [5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Blair)] the California Supreme
Court held the then existing statutory procedure for claim and delivery
unconstitutional on the grounds that (1) it violated procedural due
process by allowing a taking of property without prior notice or opportunity to be heard, and (2) the official intrusions authorized were unreasonable searches and seizures unless made with probable cause (referring to probable cause to believe both that the plaintiff's claim to the
property is valid and that the property to be seized was in a certain
place).
Chapter 855 operates as a substantive revision of California's claim
and delivery law, in response to the decision rendered in Blair [CAL.
STATS. 1972, c. 855, §3].
Section 509, as enacted by Chapter 855, provides that the plaintiff,
in an action to recover the possession of personal property, may, at the
time of issuance of summons, or at any time before trial claim the delivery of such property to him. Former §509, repealed by Chapter
855, provided that the plaintiff could claim such delivery at any time
before answer.
When a delivery is claimed, §510(a) provides that plaintiff must file
an affidavit, verified complaint, or declaration, under penalty of perjury, which must show: (1) plaintiff is the owner of the property
claimed or is entitled to the possession thereof, the source of such title
or right, and, if plaintiff's interest in such property is based upon a
written instrument, a copy thereof shall be attached; (2) that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, the means by which the
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defendant came into possession thereof, and the cause of such detention according to his best knowledge, information and belief; (3) a
particular description of the property, a statement of its actual value,
and a statement to his best knowledge, information and belief concerning the location of the property and of the residence and business address, if any, of the defendant; and (4) that the property has not been
taken for a tax assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute, or seized under an execution against the property of the plaintiff, or, if so seized,
that it is by statute exempt from such seizure. Prior to Chapter 855,
§510 did not require the plaintiff to make such allegations under penalty of perjury, and only required that the affidavit contain general allegations that the plaintiff was the owner of the property or had right
to possession to such property; that defendant was wrongfully detaining
the property; the cause of such detention; the value of the property
detained; and that the property had not been taken for a tax assessment, or fine, pursuant to statute, or seized under an execution or an
attachment against the property of the plaintiff, or, if so seized, that it
was by statute exempt from such seizure.
Section 510(b) requires that upon receipt of the affidavit, verified
complaint, or declaration prescribed by §510(a), the court shall,
without delay, issue an order directed to the defendant to show cause
why the property should not be taken from him and delivered to the
plaintiff. The order to show cause shall fix the date and time for the
hearing thereon, which shall be no sooner than 10 days from the issuance thereof and shall direct the time within which service thereof shall
be made upon the defendant. Such order shall inform the defendant
that he may file affidavits on his behalf with the court and may appear
and present testimony on his behalf at the time of such hearing, or that
he may, at or prior to such hearing, file with the court a written undertaking to stay the delivery of the property, in accordance with the provisions of §514 (discussed infra), and that if he fails to appear, plaintiff will apply to the court for a writ of possession. The order shall also
fix the manner in which service thereof shall be made; which shall be
by personal service, or in accordance with the provisions of §1011 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, or in such manner as the judge may determine to be reasonably calculated to afford notice thereof to the defendant under the circumstances appearing from the verified complaint,
affidavit, or declaration. Under prior law (former §511), upon endorsement in writing upon the affidavit, the plaintiff could immediately acquire a writ of possession requiring the sheriff, constable, or
marshal to forthwith seize the property claimed without notice or hearPacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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ing on the matter. It is noteworthy that this entire process occurred
outside the judicial system, i.e., a clerk was empowered to issue writs of
possession.
Section 510(c) specifies the narrowly defined instances in which the
court is authorized to issue a summary writ of possession prior to a
noticed hearing. The summary writ may issue if probable cause appears that any of the following exist:
(1) the defendant gained possession of the property by theft, as defined by any section of Title 13 (commencing with §447) of the Penal
Code;
(2) the property consists of one or more negotiable instruments or
credit cards;
(3) by reason of specific, competent evidence shown, by testimony
within the personal knowledge of an affiant or witness, the property is
perishable, and will perish before any noticed hearing can be had, or is
in immediate danger of destruction, serious harm, concealment, or removal from this state, or of sale to an innocent purchaser; and that the
holder of such property threatens to destroy, harm, conceal, remove it
from the state, or sell it to an innocent purchaser.
However, when a writ of possession has been issued prior to hearing
under the provisions of §510(c), the defendant or other person from
whom possession of such property has been taken may apply to the
court for an order shortening the time for hearing on the order to show
cause, and the court may, upon such application, shorten the time for
such hearing, and direct that the matter be heard on not less than 48
hours notice to the plaintiff.
Section 510(d) authorizes the court, in any case, to exercise its discretion by issuing a temporary restraining order in addition to the order to show cause. If the court so elects, the temporary restraining order, directed to the defendant, may prohibit such acts with respect to
the property as may appear to be necessary for the preservation of the
rights of the parties and the status of the property.
Section 510(e) directs the court, upon the hearing on the order to
show cause, to consider the showing made by the parties appearing,
and to make a preliminary determination as to which party, with reasonable probability, is entitled to the possession, use, and disposition
of the property pending final adjustment of the claims of the parties.
Should the court, consistent with the above described determination,
find that the action is one in which a prejudgment writ of possession
would be proper, the court shall issue such writ.
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Section 511 imposes two specific limitations upon issuance of the
writ of possession: (1) a writ of possession shall not issue to enter the
private premises of any person for the purpose of seizure of property
unless the court shall determine from competent evidence that there is
probable cause to believe that the property or some part thereof is located therein; and (2) a writ of possession shall not issue until plaintiff
has filed with the court a written undertaking executed by two or more
sufficient sureties, approved by the court, to the effect that they are
bound to the defendant in double the value of the property, as determined by the court, for the return of the property to the defendant, if
return thereof be ordered, and for the payment to him of any sum as
may from any cause be recovered against the plaintiff.
It should be noted that the requirement of an undertaking prior to
the issuance of a writ of possession is essentially identical to the requirement under previous law [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §512, repealed,
CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 855, §1].
Section 512(a), as enacted by Chapter 855, provides that a writ of
possession issued by the court must describe the specific property to be
seized and must specify the location or locations where, as determined
by the court from all the evidence, there is probable cause to believe
the property or some part thereof will be found. Attached to the writ,
there must be a copy of the undertaking filed by the plaintiff, and the
writ must inform the defendant that he has the right to except to the
sureties upon such undertaking or to file a written undertaking for the
redelivery of such property pursuant to §514 (discussed infra). The
writ shall be directed to the sheriff, constable, or marshal, within whose
jurisdiction the property is located, and shall direct the levying officer
to seize the property if it is found, and to retain it in his custody. Section 512(b) authorizes the court to endorse, without further notice, a
writ of possession directing the levying officer to search for the property at another location or locations and to seize the property if found,
provided that the plaintiff, or someone on his behalf files an affidavit
or declaration with the court showing probable cause for such additional search or searches. It is significant that under prior law, there
was no express statutory basis for the court to authorize additional
searches for the subject property by ancillary writ of possession as is
now provided for by §512(b). Furthermore, prior to the enactment of
Chapter 855, the writ of possession was not required to include notice
to the defendant of his rights to except to the sureties upon the undertaking.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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Section 513 prescribes the manner in which the levying officer is required to execute the writ of possession. The manner of execution
provided by §513 is essentially the same as that required under former
§512. However, §513, as added by Chapter 855, specifically sets forth
the manner of execution when the property to be seized under the writ
is located within a building or enclosure. In such a case, the levying
officer shall demand its delivery, announcing his identity, purpose, and
the authority under which he acts. If the property is not voluntarily
delivered, he shall cause the building or enclosure to be broken open
in such manner as he reasonably believes will cause the least damage
to the building or enclosure, and take the property into his possession.
The levying officer may call upon the power of the county to aid and
protect him, but if he reasonably believes that entry and seizure of the
property will involve a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm
to any person, he shall refrain from seizure of the property and shall
forthwith make a return before the court from which the writ issued,
setting forth the reasons for his belief that such risk exists. The court
shall then make such orders and decrees as may be appropriate. In
comparison to §513, Section 1174 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which outlines the process for enforcement of an unlawful detainer
judgment, requires that if the tenant does not voluntarily vacate the
premises the sheriff shall take physical possession of the property by
force, but does not provide, as does §513, for instructions to the sheriff
in the event that physical force would create a substantial risk of death
or serious bodily harm. The provisions of previous law regarding the
manner of execution of the writ of possession when the property subject to the writ is a dwelling, such as a house trailer, mobilehome or
boat are retained by Chapter 855. Also carried over by Chapter 855
are essentially the same notice requirements as were provided for by
former §512. That is, the levying officer shall, without delay, serve
upon the defendant a copy of the writ of possession and written undertaking, the verified complaint, affidavit or declaration, by delivering the
same to him personally, if he can be found, or to his agent from whose
possession the property is taken; or, if neither can be found, by leaving
them at the usual place of abode of either with some person of suitable
age and discretion; or, if neither have any known place of abode, by
mailing them to their last known address.
Section 514 provides for return of the subject property, if such property has already been levied upon, or termination of the hearing on the
order to show cause, if the defendant files a written undertaking, executed by two or more sufficient sureties approved by the court. Prior
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law provided for return of the property upon defendant's undertaking
in a similar fashion [CAL. CODE CIV. Noc. §514, repealed, CAL.
STATS. 1972, c. 855, §1].
Chapter 855 further specifies, all in accordance with prior law, the
manner whereby any sureties filed pursuant to the above discussed provisions may be qualified or objected to (§515); the conditions precedent to the delivery of the property to the entitled party by the levying
officer (§516); the procedure to be adopted in the event that third
party claims are required to be litigated (§517); and the time period
(20 days) within which the writ of possession shall be returned
(§518).
Chapter 855 makes two additional changes in the previous claim
and delivery legislation: (1) §519 provides that after the property has
been delivered to a party or the value thereof secured by an undertaking as provided by §514, the court shall, by appropriate order, protect
the party in the possession of such property until final determination
of the action; and (2) §520 specifies that in all proceedings brought to
recover the possession of personal property, all courts in which such
actions are pending, shall upon request of any party thereto, give such
actions precedence over all other civil actions (except actions to which
special precedence is otherwise given by law) in the matter of setting
such actions for hearing or trial, and in hearing or trial thereof, to the
end that all such actions shall be quickly heard and determined.
Section 521 states that the provisions of Chapter 855 shall be operative only until December 31, 1975, and on and after that date shall
have no force or effect. Presumably, the California Law Revision
Commission will draft and submit a proposal for further revision of
California claim and delivery law sometime prior to that date [See
CALiFORNiA LAW REVISION COMMSSION, Tentative Recommendation
Relating to the Claim and Delivery Statute (Sept. 1972) (hereinafter
cited as COMMISSION) ].
Chapter 855 was adopted as an urgency measure [CAL. STATS. 1972,
c. 855, §3].

COMMENT
Chapter 855 comprises the initial legislative response to Blair v.
Pitchess (supra). In Blair, plaintiffs, Los Angeles residents and taxpayers, brought a taxpayers suit under Code of Civil Procedure §526a,
to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds. Defendants named
were the county and civil enforcement officers (sheriff, marshal, and
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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constable) executing the claim and delivery law [CAL. CODE CIv.
PRoc. §509 et seq., repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 855, §1]. The
constitutional challenge was based on the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution, and the California Constitution, article I, § § 13 and 19. The lower court granted plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment and issued an injunction restraining defendants
from taking personal property without a prior hearing on the merits
of the case, and from entering a private place to search for and seize
personal property without prior probable cause being established before a magistrate. The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that the existing law relating to claim and delivery was unconstitutional.
Under the prior law, a plaintiff seeking to invoke the provisional
remedy of claim and delivery to secure immediate possession of the
property, simply filed his action, and, after having summons issued,
provided a levying officer with an affidavit, notice, and an undertaking,
together with copies of the complaint and summons. If such documents were in order, the levying officer issued a writ of possession and
immediately proceeded to take custody of the property for eventual delivery to the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the levying officer was authorized to use force and break into any building or enclosure in order
to effect seizure of the property. Thus, no court order nor prior judicial
review by a judical officer of either the merits of the claim or the general availability of the remedy to the plaintiff was required.
In holding the above statutory claim and delivery procedure unconstitutional, the Blair decision was the logical extension of Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp. [395 U.S. 337 (1969)], in which the United
States Supreme Court declared that Wisconsin's statutory scheme permitting prejudgment garnishment of wages was unconstitutional because it authorized a "taking" of property without procedural due process as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment. This extension was
confirmed in 1972 by the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin [407
U.S. 67 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Fuentes)] which invalidated the
claim and delivery laws of Florida and Pennsylvania authorizing the
summary seizure of property without an opportunity for a pre-seizure
hearing.
The Fuentes case was in accord with Blair in establishing that as a
primary constitutional prerequisite, any statutory scheme for claim and
delivery must provide for a notice hearing prior to levy of the writ of
possession in the majority of cases:
The primary question in the present cases is whether these state
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statutes are constitutionally defective in failing to provide for
hearings "at a meaningful time." The Florida replevin process
guarantees an opportunity for a hearing after the seizure of goods,
and the Pennsylvania process allows a post-seizure hearing if the
aggrieved party shoulders the burden of initiating one. But neither the Florida nor Pennsylvania statutes provides for notice or
an opportunity to be heard before the seizure. The issue is
whether procedural due process in the context of these cases requires an opportunity for a hearing before the state authorizes its
agents to seize property in the possession of a person upon the
application of another . . . We hold that the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin provisions work a deprivation of
property without due process of law insofar as they deny the right
to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from
their possessor. Our holding, however, is a narrow one. We do
not question the power of a state to seize goods before a final
judgment in order to protect the security interests of creditors so
long as those creditors have tested their claim to the goods through
the process of a fair prior hearing [Fuentes at 80, 96].
Chapter 855 seems to meet the general requirements of procedural
due process mandated by Blair and Fuentes. However, §510(c), as
added by Chapter 855 sanctions the issuance of summary writs of possession in specified instances. Both Blair, and later Fuentes, have recognized certain situations wherein summary seizure of property might
be constitutionally justified:
We recognize that in some instances a very real danger may exist
that the debtor may abscond with the property or that the property will be destroyed. In such situations a summary procedure
may be consonant with the constitutional principles [Blair at 278,
486 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57].
There are "extraordinary situations" that justify postponing notice
and opportunity for a hearing . . . These situations, however,
must be truly unusual. Only in a few limited situations has this
Court allowed outright seizure without opportunity for a prior
hearing. First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the state has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a governmental official, responsible for determining under the standards of
a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the
particular instance. Thus, the Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the internal revenue of the United
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to protect
against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the
public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food (emphasis
added) [Fuentes at 90-92].
Does §510(c) conform to the statutory tailoring prescribed above by
Blair and Fuentes? The section would appear to meet the "extraordinary circumstances" test set forth in Blair for valid summary issuance
of a writ of possession. It is questionable, however, whether §510(c)
satisfies the stricter "extraordinary situations" test outlined by the
United States Supreme Court in Fuentes. This is because the availability of the summary writ under §510(c) is not, by its language, confined to situations where the seizure is "directly necessary to secure an
important governmental or general public interest," i.e., it is questionable whether a creditor department store's interest in recovering property sold under a conditional sales contract to a defaulting purchaser
who has threatened to abscond with or destroy the chattel amounts to
a "general public interest." Apparently, under §510(c), a summary
writ would be available to the department store in such a case [See
COMMSSION at 5].
Perhaps further erosion of the constitutional footing of §510(c) may
have been supplied by the California Supreme Court in Randone v.
Appellate Department [5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr.
709 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Randone)], a decision rendered two
months after Blair, in which the court held California's prejudgment
attachment scheme, as authorized by the then existing §537(1), unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds because no noticed
hearing prior to attachment was provided [for an analysis of the new
attachment legislation prompted by Randone, see Comment, Attachment in California: Senate Bill 1048, the Interim Response to Randone, this volume at 146]. In Randone, the court, in part, concluded
that with respect to attachment "a creditor's interest, even in these 'special circumstances' [the court had just quoted the passage from Blair
delineating the "extraordinary circumstances" necessary for issuance of
summary writs of possession in claim and delivery actions] is not sufficient to justify depriving a debtor of 'necessities of life' prior to a hearing on the merits of the creditor's claim" [Randone at 556 n.19, 488
P.2d at 27 n.19, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723 n.19]. Therefore, to the extent
that claim and delivery is analogous to attachment on the procedural
due process issue, §510(c) could conceivably be unconstitutional under the Randone reasoning when applied to a case where a summary
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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writ of possession is issued to seize a "necessity of life," even where the
debtor has threatened to abscond with or destroy such property [See
COmmissioN at 5-7].

The court in Blair was not content to strike down the claim and
delivery law on procedural due process grounds alone-Fourth Amendment violations were equally relied upon as an alternative ground, The
Blair court found that the official intrusions authorized by former §517
[repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 855, §1] amounted to unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, the court intimated that a statute
which was tailored to require probable cause for the intrusion in order
to gain custody of personalty under a valid writ of possession would
not violate the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the court stated:
Obviously, the affidavits customarily required of those initiating
claim and delivery procedures do not satisfy the probable cause
standard. Such affidavits need allege only that the plaintiff owns
property which the defendant is wrongfully detaining. The affiants are not obliged to set forth facts showing probable cause to
believe such allegations to be true, nor must they show probable
cause to believe that the property is at the location specified in the
process. Finally, such affidavits fail to comply with the probable
cause standard because they are not passed upon by a magistrate,
but are examined only by the clerical staff of the sheriff's or marshal's department, and then merely for their regularity in form
[Blair at 273-74, 486 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 53].
It would seem from this statement that, in order to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment, the plaintiff must show both probable cause to believe his
claim to the property is a valid one as well as probable cause to believe
that the property is at the location specified in the verified complaint,
affidavit, or declaration [COMMISSION at 8].

Although the Fuentes decision did not rest on Fourth Amendment
grounds, the opinion did state that "once a prior hearing is required,
at which the applicant for a writ must establish the probable validity
of his claim for repossession, the Fourth Amendment problem may
well be obviated" [Fuentes at 96 n.32].
Chapter 855 would appear to satisfy the two-prong probable cause
dictates of Blair. Section 511 (a) specifies that no writ of possession
to enter the private premises of any person for the purpose of seizure
of property will issue unless the court shall determine from competent
evidence that there is probable cause to believe that the property or
some part thereof is located therein. Additionally, §§510(a) (affiPacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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davit requirements) and 510(c) (elements requisite to issuance of an
ex parte writ of possession) both demand that plaintiff fashion his allegations in a manner to assert the probable validity of his claim to the
right of possession.
In conclusion, it would clearly appear that Chapter 855 is generally
responsive to the guidelines established by Blair and Fuentes for constitutional claim and delivery legislation. Chapter 855 removes the
issuance of writs of possession from the levying officer and places such
authority within the judicial forum. It insures, at least in the majority
of cases, that no writ of possession will issue without a prior hearing
on the merits of the plaintiff's claim.
However, as discussed above, the strongest constitutional challenge
to the new legislation will be whether the allowance for the issuance of
ex parte writs, as provided by §510(c), falls within the exceptions circumscribed by the United States Supreme Court in Fuentes. If the
Randone prohibition of ex parte writs of attachment where "necessities
of life" are involved applies with equal force to the claim and delivery
situation, the legislation will be even more vulnerable to constitutional
attack [CoMMIssION at 5].
The California Law Revision Commission, in its tentative recommendations for revision, has outlined a possible solution to the arguable
constitutional deficiencies of §510(c)-strike the section entirely, leaving no statutory authority for ex parte issuance of writs of possession.
The Commission reasons that the creditor's interest is sufficiently protected by the avaliability of a temporary restraining order even in cases
where the debtor has threatened to destroy or abscond with the property. Apparently the protection arises because of the court's power to
enforce the temporary restraining order by contempt proceedings
[CoMMISSION at 11-14].
Finally, as a collateral matter, it should be noted that the constitutionality of self-help repossession (without resort to judicial process,
as in claim and delivery) is currently suspect. In Adams v. Egley
[338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972)], the United States District Court,
Southern District of California, held that private repossession of personal property sold on installment contracts was violative of Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process. The court found that the authority of California Commercial Code §§9503 and 9504, which is traditionally asserted by creditors in chattel finance contracts for private
repossession in the event of purchaser default, amounted to sufficient
state action for a 14th Amendment violation. However, shortly after
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Adams, a flatly contrary decision was rendered by the District Court,
Northern District of California [Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F.
Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972)].
See Generally:
1) 2 WITKIN, CALiFORNA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies §24-38 (2d ed. 1971);
§24A (Supp. 1972).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE
§§10.01-10.35 (1968); H§10.01, 10.10 (Supp. 1972).
3) CAmnFoRNt_ LAW REVISION COMiMISSiON, Tentative Recommendation Relating to
4)
5)

the Claim and Delivery Statute (Sept. 1972).

Jackson, Attachment In California-WhatNow?, 3 PAC. L.J. 1 (1972).
Comment, Attachment in California: Senate Bill 1048, the Interim Response to
Randone, this volume at 146.

Civil Procedure; prejudgment attachment
Code of Civil Procedure §§537, 537.1, 537.2, 537.3, 538, 538.1,
538.2, 538.3, 538.4, 538.5, 541, 542.1, 542.2, 542.3, 542.4, 524b,
542c (new); §§537.5, 539 (amended); §§537, 538, 541, 542b
(repealed); Corporations Code §§126.1, 15006.1, 15501.1 (new);
Government Code §7203 (amended).
SB 1048 (Zenovich); STATS 1972, Ch 550
Provides for and limits the availability of prejudgment attachment as a provisional remedy to specified defendants and property;
establishes revised prejudgment attachment procedure.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 550, the Code of Civil Procedure
[§537 et seq.] provided for prejudgment attachment in cases of unsecured debts without requiring a procedure for affording notice and a
hearing to the defendant before levy of, attachment. The only major
limitation upon a creditor's prejudgment remedy was the exemption
from attachment of earnings of the defendant as provided for by
§690.6(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§537, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1523, §2, at 30581. Summary attachment was available as against all classes of defendants and
was not limited as to the type or class of property subject to the writ.
Chapter 550 completely revises applicable portions of the Code of
Civil Procedure relating to the writ of attachment to limit the general
availability of the writ, and establishes procedures requisite to the obtaining of a writ of attachment designed to give notice to the defendant
and to insure him of the opportunity to have a hearing on whether the
writ shall issue.
For a full discussion of the new attachment procedure pursuant to
Chapter 550, and an analysis of whether this legislation meets the conPacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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stitutional requirements mandated by the California Supreme Court in
Randone v. Appellate Department [5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971)], see Comment, Attachment in California:
Senate Bill 1048, The Interim Response to Randone, this volume at
146.
Civil Procedure; wage garnishment
Code of Civil Procedure §§682.3, 690.6, 690.50 (amended).
AB 685 (Cullen); STATS 1972, Ch 43
(Effective April 6, 1972)
AB 2354 (Warren); STATS 1972, Ch 649
(Effective August 9, 1972)
Chapter 43 amends §690.6(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure to
provide that all earnings of a judgment debtor received for personal
services rendered at any time within 30 days next preceding the date
of withholding by the employer under §682.3 infra, which are necessary for the support of the debtor's family residing in this state and
supported in whole or in part by the debtor, are exempt from execution
unless the debts are: (1) incurred for personal services rendered by
an employee or former employee of the debtor; or (2) incurred by the
debtor, his wife, or his family for "common necessaries" of life [See
Ratzlaff v. Portino, 14 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 1015, 92 Cal. Rptr. 722,
723 (1971); see also, Seid, Necessaries-Common or Otherwise,' 14
HAST.

L.J. 28 (1962)].

Prior to its amendment by Chapter 43, §690.6(c) exempted only
those earnings received for personal services rendered at any, time
within 30 days next preceding the levy of execution.
Section 682.3 requires an employer served with a writ of, execution
to withhold the amount specified in the writ from earnings then or
thereafter due to the judgment debtor and not exempt under Section
690.6. Prior to amendment, this section also provided that if the judgment debtor wished to claim a full exemption of all his earnings in accordance with the provisions of §690.6 discussed above, and §690.50
infra, he was required to claim the exemption within 10 days of the
date of the levy of execution. This requirement has been deleted by
Chapter 649. The debtor may now claim a full exemption in accordance with §690.6 and §690.50.
Section 690.50 (procedure for claiming exemption) requires that the
judgment debtor make his claim of exemption from execution within
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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10 days from the date upon which the property was levied. However,
this section has been amended by Chapter 649 to provide that for the
purposes of this section, if the property levied upon consists of the earnings of a judgment debtor, each date that earnings are withheld from
the judgment debtor shall be deemed to be the date such earnings were
levied upon. Section 690.50 has also been amended to provide that a
judgment debtor shall have the right to file a separate claim of exemption each time that a withholding of earnings occurs, provided that if
a prior claim of exemption has been adjudicated under the same levy,
each separate claim of exemption must thereafter be supported by a
statement under oath alleging the changed circumstances which support
the new claim of exemption. If a claim of exemption is allowed, the
judgment creditor shall have the right, at any time during the effective
period of the claim of exemption, to move the court for consideration
of the claim previously granted on the grounds of a material change of
circumstances affecting the debtor's exemption rights. When the judgment creditor does make such a motion, he must support his motion
by a statement under oath alleging the changed circumstances which
support his motion for consideration.
COMMENT
Chapter 43 and Chapter 649 have both been enacted to clarify and
to correct inconsistencies among §§682.3, 690.6, and 690.50 which
arose as a result of the 1971 enactment of §682.3 and amendment of
§690.6 [CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1684, §2, at 3612, §5, at 3614; see 3
PAC. LiJ.,

REVIEW OF SELECTED

1971

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION

221

(1972)].
The 1971 enactment of §682.3 provided that a levy of execution
upon wages would remain effective for 90 days, eliminating the prior
requirement of serving a separate writ of execution to effect each wage
withholding [5 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Enforcement of Judgment §66A (Supp. 1972)]. However, the requirement that the judgment debtor file his claim of exemption within 10 days of the date of
levy of execution [CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §690.50] remained unchanged, and the amendment to §690.6, which grants an exemption
for all earnings that are "necessaries," stated that such earnings were
only subject to exemption if they were earned within 30 days next preceding the levy of execution. Therefore, these sections could have been
construed to preclude the judgment debtor from effectively exempting
any of his wages due during the entire 90 day period of the writ.
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Chapter 43 is intended to conform the provisions of §690.6 to the
legislative purpose for enacting §682.3. Section 682.3(b) states that
exemptions claimed pursuant to §§690.6 and 690.50 "shall extend to
any wages withheld whether or not withheld after the claim of exemption is filed." The purpose of this provision was to permit a judgment
debtor's claim of exemption to apply to all withholding done by an
employer over the 90-day period of the writ of execution [A.B. 685,
CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 43, §31.
By providing that earnings may be
exempted from execution if for services rendered 30 days preceding
the date of withholding by the employer, rather than 30 days preceding the levy of execution, this legislative purpose should be fulfilled.
The net effect of the enactment of these two chapters may be summarized briefly as follows: (1) the judgment debtor now clearly has
the right to claim an exemption of all of his earnings over the entire
90-day period of the writ of execution; (2) if a judgment debtor cannot qualify for an exemption of all of his earnings at the beginning of
the 90-day period and subsequent circumstances have arisen whereby
an exemption would be proper, he is now able to secure such an exemption; (3) if an exemption claim has previously been adjudicated
and denied, upon a subsequent exemption claim the judgment debtor
must allege changes in circumstances which would give rise to an exemption; and (4) if a continuing exemption has been allowed, the
judgment creditor may seek to terminate the exemption by alleging
sufficient changed circumstances.
It should be noted that the above discussion of the exemption of
all earnings from levy of execution under specified conditions provided
by §690.6(c) is to be distinguished from the automatic exemption of
all earnings from levy of attachment [CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §690.6
(a)] and from the automatic exemption of one-half of the judgment
debtor's earnings from levy of execution [CAL. CODE Civ. PROC.
§690.6(b)]. These two exemptions are termed "automatic" because
the earnings are exempt without the filing of a claim of exemption pursuant to §690.50.
See Generally:
1) Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California:- A Study and Recommendations, 53
CALIF. L. REv. 1214 (1965).
2) 5 WrrKiN, CAoLFONIA PROCEDURE, Enforcement of Judgment §§25, 60-70 (2d ed.
1971), (Supp. 1972).
3)
4)

3 PAC. L.J., REviEw OF SELECTED 1971 CALIoRNA LEoIsLATIoN 221 (1972).
2 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1970 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 325 (1971).

5)
6)

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1971 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 12-2.
CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE

§§17.73-17.81 (Supp. 1972).
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Civil Procedure; attachment and executionmotor vehicle exemption
Code of Civil Procedure §690.2 (amended).
AB 1394 (Murphy); STATS 1972, Ch 744
In 1970, §690.24, exempting from attachment or execution of judgment a motor vehicle of specified value, was repealed and §690.2 was
added to provide for the exemption [CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1523, §§12,
47, at 3071, 3077; see 2 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1970 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 320 (1971) ].
Chapter 744 amends §690.2 to increase to $500 the maximum value
of a motor vehicle, over and above all liens and encumbrances, which
is exempt from attachment or execution. Previously, the maximum
value exempt under §690.2 was $350.
Since, under present law, the motor vehicle exemption can only be
claimed where the total value of the vehicle does not exceed $1000,
§690.2 has been further amended by Chapter 744 to provide that the
value of the motor vehicle shall be the value of the particular vehicle
as set forth in established used car price guides customarily used by
California automobile dealers, or, if not listed in such guides, the value
shall be fair market value.
Additionally, §690.2 has been amended to specify an order of priority for the disposition of proceeds in the event of an execution sale
of the motor vehicle (a case where the total value of the motor vehicle
sought to be exempted exceeds $1000, or where the value, over and
above liens and encumbrances, exceeds $500). Chapter 744 provides
that the proceeds of the sale must be applied in the following order of
priority: first, to the seller or mortgagee of the motor vehicle; second,
to the exemption claimant up to the amount of the allowable motor
vehicle exemption ($500); and third, the balance, if any, in like manner as the proceeds of sale are applied in other cases. Further, Chapter 744 provides that any money paid to the claimant pursuant to the
above disposition scheme, is exempt from attachment or execution for
a period of three months.
COMMENT
Chapter 744 was enacted to remedy several problems which had
arisen with regard to the application of §690.2. Apparently, it was
believed that due to inflationary pressures of the past few years the
$350 maximum equity allowance, established in 1969, was inadequate.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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Thus, Chapter 744 increases that maximum to $500, an amount purportedly more representative of investment in a modest automobile in
light of current market realities.
Chapter 744 specifies the mode by which value of the motor vehicle
in question shall be determined. Previously, there being no method of
valuation prescribed by §690.2, many valuation disputes had arisen.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 744, in the event of an execution
sale, the exemption claimant lost all of his equity in the automobile.
With the loss of his equity exemption, the claimant was often unable
to purchase a modest replacement vehicle for employment or family
transportation. The apparent effect of Chapter 744 is to allow an
equity exemption of up to $500 even in the event of an execution sale,
while at the same time not permitting the retention of any type of luxury vehicle. The provision exempting the proceeds from the execution
sale, which have been returned to the claimant, for a period of three
months seems to be designed to allow the claimant adequate time to
purchase a replacement vehicle.
It should be noted that a motor vehicle exemption, as provided by
§690.2, cannot be claimed as against a judgment recovered for the vehicle's price [CAL. CODE CrV. PRoc. §690.52]. Also, it would appear
that according to In re Rauer's Collection Company [87 Cal. App. 2d
248, 196 P.2d 803 (1948)] the new and increased exemptions provided for by §690.2, as amended, apply only as against obligations
which were incurred after the effective date of Chapter 744.
See Generally:

1)
2)

3 Wrrn, w, CALn ORNA PRoCEDuRE, Enforcement of Judgment §17 (1971).
2 PAc. L.J., REvIEw OF SELECTED 1970 CALIFouA LEGISLATION 320 (1971).

Civil Procedure; attachment and executionhousetrailer exemption
Code of Civil Procedure §690.3 (amended).
AB 324 (Vasconcellos); STATS 1972, Ch 418
Section 690.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been amended to
increase the exemption from attachment and execution (as provided
by Code of Civil Procedure Section 690) for a housetrailer or mobilehome in which the debtor, or family of such debtor, actually resides.
The exemption has been increased from a value not exceeding $5000
to a value not exceeding $9,500 over and above all liens and encumbrances on that housetrailer or mobilehome, provided neither such
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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debtor nor the spouse of such debtor has an existing homestead as provided by Title 5 (commencing with Section 1237) of the Civil Code.
See Generally:
1) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE
§§19.1-19.44 (1968).

2)

21 CAL. JUt. 2d Exemptions §1, et seq. (1955).

3)
4)

25 CAL. JUR. 2d Homesteads §, et seq. (1955).
2 PAC. L.J., REviEW OF SELECTED 1970 CALIFOPNIA LEGISLATION 320, 326, 328

(1971).

Civil Procedure; exemption from execution-eminent domain
awards and relocation assistance payments
Government Code §7268 (repealed); Code of Civil Procedure
§690.8 (new).
AB 987 (Brathwaite); STATS 1972, Ch 822
A. 2024 (Lanterman); STATS 1972, Ch 861
Chapter 822 adds §690.8 to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide
that compensation received from a public entity which acquires for
public use a dwelling actually owned and occupied by the debtor; and
the proceeds received from a public entity for relocation assistance upon
displacement from a dwelling pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing
with §7260) of the Government Code, or Article 4.5 (commencing
with §170) of the Streets and Highways Code shall be exempt from execution and attachment for a period of six months from the date of
receipt. Such compensation and proceeds shall be exempt in the
amount, over and above all liens and encumbrances, provided by Section 1260 of the Civil Code ($20,000 Homestead exemption).
Chapter 861 also adds §690.8 to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that proceeds received from a public entity as relocation payments
pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing with §7260) of the Government
Code for displacement from a dwelling shall be exempt from execution
and attachment for a period of six months from the date of receipt.
Prior to the addition of §690.8, there were no provisions for an exemption from execution and attachment of proceeds received from
property acquisition by eminent domain, although prior to the acquisition the debtor may have been entitled to a homestead exemption pursuant to Civil Code §1237 et seq. Thus a person displaced by eminent
domain was deprived of an exemption during the time that he had not
reinvested the proceeds derived from the acquisition of his property in

another residence. The addition of §690.8 provides a six month period in which such proceeds are exempt, to allow a reasonable time for
relocation.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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Chapter 861 also repeals §7268 of the Government Code as a redundant section, since the same provisions are contained in §7267.8
which is part of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Property Acquisition Act [CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1489]. This section authorizes
the adoption of rules and regulations by state and local agencies to implement the Act.
COMMENT
When, two laws are enacted on the same subject, if reasonably possible, they will be construed to keep both in effect. However, to the
extent that the laws are in conflict, the later chapter will prevail as a
more recent expression of legislative intent [See CAL, GOV'T CODE
§9605; 45 CAL. JUR. 2d, Statutes §§79-81 (1958)].
How the courts will construe these two chapters is a matter of conjecture. Chapter 861 will prevail over Chapter 822 to the extent that
these two chapters are inconsistent. In this regard, it should be noted
that Chapter 861 departs from the provisions of Chapter 822 in that
Chapter 861 does not exempt relocation assistance when persons are
displaced by highway construction pursuant to Article 4.5 (commencing with §170) of the Streets and Highways Code, does not exempt
compensation received from a public entity which acquires for a public
use a dwelling owned and occupied by the debtor, nor does Chapter
861 limit the exemption to the $20,000 amount specified in Civil Code
§ 1260.
See Generally:
1) Comment, Relocation Assistance in California: Legislative Response to the Federal Program,3 PAc. L.J. 114 (1972).

Civil Procedure; justice courts-jurisdiction
Code of Civil Procedure § 112 (amended).
SB 1045 (Grunsky); STATS 1972, Ch 219
Section 112 of the Code of Civil Procedure pertains to civil cases
and proceedings within the original jurisdiction of justice courts. Section 112(b) has been amended to provide that justice courts shall
have original jurisdiction in all proceedings in forcible entry, or forcible
or unlawful detainer where the rental value is three hundred dollars or
less per month, and where the whole amount of damages claimed is
one thousand dollars or less. Prior to amendment the rental value
limit was $125 or less.
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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See Generally:
1) 1 WMrN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §184 (2d ed. 1971); Jurisdiction §28
(2d ed. 1971).

Civil Procedure; justice courts-city sessions
Government Code §71341 (amended).
AB 362 (Ketchum); STATS 1972, Ch 260
By authority of the 1950 amendment to article VI, §11 of the California Constitution, each county in the state is divided in order to provide for judicial districts and for municipal and/or justice courts
therein. Justice courts are presently required in all judicial districts
of 40,000 residents or less, whereas judicial districts having a population of more than 40,000 persons are required to have municipal courts.
Government Code §71341 has been amended to delete the requirement that each county board of supervisors provide for justice court
sessions in every city not included within a judicial district in which
there is a municipal court.
COMMENT

The 1950 amendment to article VI, §11, was intended to reduce the
number of inferior courts in the state [Savage v. Sox, 118 Cal. App.
2d 479, 488, 258 P.2d 80, 85 (1953)]. As amended, Government
Code §71341 will consolidate judicial process in less populous judicial
districts; in effect requiring only one justice court location per judicial
district with less than 40,000 residents. Chapter 260 is representative

of a continuing effort to decrease the number of justice courts. Between 1953 and 1971 the number of justice courts in California decreased from 349 to 231 [See B. CooK, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
CALIFORNIA 67 (1967); Hennessy, Qualification of California Justice
Court Judges: A Dual System, 3 PAc. L.J. 439, 444, n.36 (1972)].
"Many counties have studied the possibility of further consolidation
which would either eliminate the justice court or convert it into a
branch of the municipal court" [B. COOK, supra, at 67]. A potential
drawback resulting from fewer court locations could be an increased
burden on the public due to remoteness of court locations and possible
overcrowding. The counties which could possibly be most seriously
affected are Fresno, Imperial, Kern, Mendocino, Merced, Riverside, San Bernardino, Shasta, and Siskiyou; each relying heavily on justice courts.
See Generally:
1)

B. CooK, Thn JuD
IACL. PoCmss N CALOmRNI

(1967).
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2)

Hennessy, Qualification of California Justice Court Judges: A Dual System, 3
PAC. L.J. 439 (1972).

Civil Procedure; small claim court
Code of Civil Procedure §§117a, 117b, 117c, 117d, 117h, 117p

(amended).
SB 119 (Harmer);

STATS

1972, Ch 527

While Code of Civil Procedure §117j allows the defendant in a small
claims action to appeal an adverse judgment, the plaintiff has no such
right; the judgment being conclusive upon him (save in the case of a
cross-complaint by the defendant against the plaintiff). [See Skaff v.
Small Claims Court, 68 Cal. 2d 76, 78, 435 P.2d 825, 826, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 65, 66 (1968)]. Section 117b sets forth the forms to be used to
commence actions in small claims court. This section has been
amended to add to such forms a statement by the claimant affirming
"that this claimant understands that the judgment on his claim will be
conclusive without right of appeal by him."
Section 117a, which provides that a small claims action shall be commenced upon the execution of an affidavit by the plaintiff, is amended
to substitute "claim under oath" for the term "affidavit". Sections
117b, 117c, 117d, 117h, and 17p are ,similarly amended-substituting "claim" for "affidavit"; "claims" for "affidavits"; and "claimant"
for "affiant"-where appropriate.
COMMENT
An unsworn statement under penalty of perjury, pursuant to Code

of Civil Procedure §2015.5 has been acceptable in place of an affidavit to commence a small claims action [34 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 60, 63
(1959)]. The language of §2015.5 broadly indicates that any matter
required by law to be suipported by oath may be certified pursuant to
that section. Therefore such a statement should continue to be acceptable in lieu of a "claim under oath."
Civil Procedure; venue
Code of Civil Procedure § §117, 395 (amended).
SB 267 (Gregorio); STATS 1972, Ch 1119
Makes venue provisions respecting municipal and justice courts
applicable to small claims court actions; modifies venue- in municipal and justice courts with respect to contract actions; provides
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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that agreements to waive venue provisions in §395 are void and
unenforceable.
Chapter 1119 amends Sections 117 (jurisdiction and venue in small
claims actions) and 395 (proper court in which to bring actions) of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of Section 117, which formerly specified the proper venue in a small claims
action, have been deleted. Section 117 now states that venue in such
actions shall be the same as for civil actions filed in justice or municipal
court [See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §395].
Chapter 1119 amends Section 395(b) to provide that (subject to
the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided
in Sections 397, 397.5, 398, and 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure)
in an action founded upon an obligation of the defendant for goods,
services, loans or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal,
family, or household use, other than an obligation within the purview
of either the Unruh Act (See CAL. CIV. CODE §1812.10-venue and
jurisdiction in retail installment contracts for goods or services) or the
Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act (See CAL. CIV.
CODE §2984.4-venue in conditional sales contracts for motor vehicles), the proper county for trial is: (1) the county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract; or (2) the county in which the defendant resided at the time the contract was entered into; or (3) the
county in which the defendant resided at the time of the commencement of the action. Prior to amendment, Section 395(b) included
the county in which the defendant resided at the time the contract was
signed, rather than entered into.
Section 395(c) is amended in conformity with Section 395(b) by
substituting the judicial district in which the defendant resided at the
time the contract was entered into, instead of signed, as a proper court
for trial.
Chapter 1119 adds Section 395(d) to state that any provision of an
obligation described in subdivision (b) or (c), waiving the provisions
of those subdivisions, is void and unenforceable.
COMMENT
Section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 1971
[CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1640, §1, at 3501 to modify general venue
provisions with respect to consumer contract actions. Prior to amendment by Chapter 1640, Section 395 specified that the proper county
for trial was the county in which the obligation was to be performed,
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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the county in which the contract in fact was entered into, or the county
in which the defendant resided at the commencement of action. It
was possible for a company, such as a mail order company, to bring an
action against a consumer in the county or judicial district in which
the company was located, rather than the county or judicial district in
which the consumer resided. Such consumers were therefore forced
to litigate outside their county of residency, even though they had few
or no contacts with the county or judicial district in which the action
was initiated. Chapter 1640 was enacted as a consumer protection
measure to prevent abuses of the prior venue provisions, by specifying
that the proper county for trial was the county in which the defendant
in fact signed the contract, the county in which the defendant resided
at the time the contract was signed, or the county in which the defendant resided at the commencement of the action [Interview with William Kircher, Administrative Aide to Senator Gregoro, Sacramento,
California, October 18, 1972 (hereinafter cited as Kircher)].
Subsequent to enactment, questions arose as to whether the provisions of Chapter 1640 were applicable to small claims courts due to
the separate venue provisions of Section 117. Chapter 1119 has therefore been enacted to bring small claims courts into conformity with the
general venue provisions of Section 395. Chapter 1119 also amends
Section 395 to extend the venue provisions of Chapter 1640 to oral
as well as written contracts by providing that a proper county for trial
is the county in which the defendant resides at the time the contract
was entered into rather than signed. Prior to amendment, for actions
concerning oral contracts, venue was proper only in the county in which
the defendant resided at the commencement of the action [Kircher].
See Generally:
1) 3 PAc. L.I., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1971 CALIwORNIA LEGISLATION 240 (1972).

Civil Procedure; jury duty
Code of Civil Procedure §§200, 202, 205 (amended);
(new); Penal Code § 1046.5 (new).
SB 924 (Lagomarsino); STATS 1972, Ch 1028
SB 918 (Lagomarsino); STATS 1972, Ch 1337

§239

Chapter 1028 has amended §202 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
provide that in cases where a person is not exempted from jury duty
pursuant to any one or more of the exemptions listed in §200, such
person shall only be excused from jury duty in the case of extreme, serious hardship and then only if recommended by an official designated
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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by the presiding judge and if approved by the presiding judge or any
other judge designated by him.
Section 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure has also been amended
by Chapter 1028 to specify that the selection and listings of jurors in
each county shall be made at random. Previously, there had been no
affirmative language in the -section requiring the selection of jurors to
be made by a random selection process.
Chapter 1028 has added §239 to the Code of Civil Procedure to
establish that any juror summoned shall be entitled to volunteer to be
available on one-hour notice by telephone. In such cases the juror so
volunteering would not be obligated to appear in court until notified.
Additionally, Chapter 1028 has added §1046.5 to the Penal Code
to provide that jurors for criminal actions shall be entitled to at least
the same rights and privileges as are provided for jurors in civil cases,
including, but not limited to, such rights or privileges granted by §239
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is interesting to note that Chapter 1028 would have amended
§200 of the Code of Civil Procedure to add to the list of specific exemptions from jury duty a person who, within the last three years preceding his selection, has served as a juror either for the completion of
one trial or has made four appearances for purposes of serving as a
juror, and who has requested an exemption pursuant to §202. The
exemption was not to apply in counties having less than 5,000 population [CAL. CODE CIrv. PRoc. §200, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972,
c. 1028, §1.7]. However, the Legislature specifically deleted this
amendment to §200 by enacting Chapter 1337 [S.B. 918, CAL. STATS.
1972,c. 1337, §1].
See Generally:
1) 4 WnXKN, CALORNI..PR& EocnRE, Trial §§92-100 (2d ed. 1971), (Supp. 1972).

Civil Procedure; jury duty exemptions
Code of Civil Procedure §200 (amended).
AB 519 (Hayden); STATS 1972, Ch 390
SB 1285 (Beilenson); STATS 1972, Ch 617
Section 200 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been amended by
Chapter 390 to include within the list of specific exemptions from
jury duty: (1)a city mayor; (2)a member of a city council; or (3)
a person holding a position equivalent to a president or member of a
legislative body of a city.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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Chapter 617 amends Section 200 to exempt practicing registered
pharmacists. Previously, an exemption was granted to a druggist actually engaged in the business of dispensing medicines. The term
pharmacist is the more precise term used in the licensing statutes [CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §4080 et seq.].
COMMENT
Prior to amendment, §200(2) provided an exemption from jury duty
for a person holding a county, city and county, city, town, or township
office of profit. Although office of profit has not been judicially
or statutorily defined in California, resort to the decisions of other jurisdictions [Romney v. Barlow, 24 Utah 2d 226, 469 P.2d 497, 499
(1970); Moser v. Board of County Comm'rs of Howard County, 235
Md. 279, 201 A.2d 365, 367 (1964)] indicates that the term implies a right, authority and duty which: (1) is invested by appointment
or election; (2) involves the exercise of some function of the sovereign
power; and (3) is for some compensation in excess of mere expenses.
Therefore §200(2) apparently would not, for example have exempted
from jury duty a city councilman serving without compensation. As
amended, §200 will provide such persons with an exemption.
See Generally:
1) 4 WnxlN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial §93 (2d ed. 1971).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF im BAR, CALIoFRIA CrviL PROCEDURE DURING TAIAL

§5.27 (1960).

Civil Procedure; civil process
Code of Civil Procedure § §410.30, 415.50, 1013a (amended).
SB 573 (Grunsky); STATS 1972, Ch 601
Support: State Bar of California
Section 410.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a
court, upon motion of a party or its own motion, finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside
this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part

on any conditions that may be just [See CONTINUING EDUCATION OF
THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1969 CODE LEGISLATION 67]. Chapter 601 amends §410.30 to state that the provisions of §418.10 of
the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to a motion to stay or dismiss the action by a defendant who has made a general appearance.
Section 418.10 [CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1610, §3, at 3363; see CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1969 CODE
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77-78] establishes the procedure for a motion to quash
service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court
or to stay or dismiss an action on the ground of inconvenient forum.
The practical effect of Chapter 601 appears to be that the motion to
stay or dismiss, if made by a defendant who has made a general appearance, may be made at any time rather than "before the last day of
his time to plead or within such further time as the court may for good
cause allow" [CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §418.10(a)]. It should be
particularly noted that §418.10 also affords defendant the right to petition an appropriate reviewing court for a writ of mandate upon denial of the motion to stay or dismiss on the ground of inconvenient
forum [CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §418.10(c)], and provides for protection against default [CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. §418.10(d)]. Since
Chapter 601 amends §410.30 to render inapplicable §418.10 in cases
where the motion to stay or dismiss on the ground of inconvenient
forum is made by a defendant who has made a general appearance, it
would appear that such a defendant would not have any specific statutory authority available to him for seeking an immediate remedy by
a writ of mandate nor would he be specially protected against the entering of a default judgment should the motion to stay or dismiss be deLEGISLATION

nied by the trial court [See 1

WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,

Ju-

risdiction §134 (2ded. 1970)].
Chapter 601 also amends §415.50 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(establishing procedure for service by publication) to correct an inconsistency between that section and §6064 of the Government Code. As
enacted in 1969 [CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1610, §3, at 3363; see CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1969 CODE LEGISLATION 73-74] §415.50 requires that publication of summons be
made in accordance with Government Code §6064 [CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. §415.50(b)], but further states that "service of a summons [by
publication] is deemed complete on the last day of publication" [CAL.
CODE Civ. PRoc. §415.50(c)]. On the other hand, §6064 of the Government Code establishes that the period of notice by publication thereunder terminates at the end of the 28th day after the initial publication.
The specific provisions of §415.50(c) should control over the general provisions of Government Code §6064 [45 CAL. JUR. 2d, Statutes
§§74-81 (1958)]. Thus, when the summons was published once
weekly for the required four weeks, with publication on the same day
each week, service was complete on the day of the fourth publication,
i.e. the 21st day. To correct this conflict between §415.50 of the Code
of Civil Procedure and §6064 of the Government Code, Chapter 601
306

Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4

CiVil Procedure
has amended §415.50 (c) to specify that service of summons by publication shall be deemed complete as provided in §6064 of the Government Code. It should be noted that Chapter 601 specifically provides
that the above described revision of §415.50 shall apply only to actions
or proceedings in which the order for the publication of summons is
made on or after the effective date of the chapter [CAL. STATS. 1972,
c. 601, §4].
Additionally, Chapter 601 amends §1013a of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to proof of service by mail to require that pleadings,
notices, and other documents served by mail bear a notation of the
date and place of its mailing or be accompanied by an unsigned copy
of the affidavit [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1013a(l)] or certificate of
mailing [CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §1013a(2), (3)]. Prior to its amendment by Chapter 601, §1013a included no provision specifically requiring that the party served by mail be informed of the effective date
of mailing. Thus, often the only way for the party served by mail to
determine the effective date of mailing was to examine the envelope
for postmark. Since envelopes are habitually discarded, the party
served by mail was not infrequently confused as to the effective date of
mailing, the determination of which is necessary to render a timely
response. The amendment to §1013a by Chapter 601 appears to
resolve this problem by requiring the party availing himself of service
by mail to either make a notation on the document served of the
date and place of its mailing, or to accompany the document with an
unsigned copy of the affidavit or certificate of mailing. The apparent
reason why such affidavit or certificate is not required to be signed is
that it could not, in all honesty, be signed prior to its sealing in the
envelope and posting in the mails.
See Generally:
1) 1 WITiN, C IFORNIA PRocEDuRE, Jurisdiction§§132-34, 260 (2d ed. 1970).
2)

3)
4)

Ryan and Berger, Forum Non Conveniens in California, 1 PAC. L.J. 532 (1970).
CoNTIaNG EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1969 CODE LEGISLAnON 67-79.
STATE BAR OF CALIFORMA, 1971 CONFERENCE RESOLUrION 12-13.

Civil Procedure; service of process-court records
Code of Civil Procedure §1013a (amended); §1052.5 (new).

AB 1922 (Hayes);

STATS

1972, Ch 1083

Chapter 1083 amends Section 1013a of the Code of Civil Procedure
to eliminate the requirement that an affidavit of service by mail be executed by a person who is a citizen of the United States.
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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Section 1052.5 has been added to the Code of Civil Procedure to
provide that in lieu of maintaining a register of actions as described
in Section 1052, the clerk of the municipal court may maintain a register
of actions by means of photographing, microphotographing, or mechanically or electronically storing the whole content of all papers and records or any portion thereof, as will constitute a memorandum, necessary to the keeping of a register of actions so long as the completeness
and chronological sequence of the register are not disturbed.
All such reproduction shall be placed in convenient, accessible files,
and provision shall be made for preserving, examining, and using them.
Any photograph, microphotograph, or photocopy which is made pursuant to this section shall be made in such manner and on such paper
as will comply with the minimum standards of quality approved therefor
by the National Bureau of Standards.
Civil Procedure; service of summons in unlawful
detainer action
Code of Civil Procedure §§417.10, 417.20 (amended); §415.45
(new).
AB 202 (Dunlap); STATS 1972, Ch 719
Section 415.45 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been added to provide for posting of summons in specified circumstances in unlawful detainer actions involving commercial property, as an alternative to the
usual procedures authorized for service of summons.
Specifically, §415.45 provides that a summons in an action for unlawful detainer of real property primarily used for commercial purposes may be served by posting if, upon affidavit, it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be
served cannot with reasonable diligence be served by employing any of
the usual methods of service authorized by article 3 (commencing
with §415.10) of the Code of Civil Procedure, other than by publication.
Once it is determined by the court that service of summons by posting would be proper, §415.45 provides that the court shall order the
summons to be posted on the premises in a manner most likely to give
actual notice to the party to be served. Additionally, the court will direct that a copy of the summons and complaint be forthwith mailed to
such party should his address be ascertained before expiration of the time
prescribed for posting of summons.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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Section 415.45 further specifies that service of summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after posting.
Notwithstanding an order for posting of the summons, pursuant to
§415.45, a summons may be served in any other authorized manner
except publication, in which event such service shall supersede any
posted summons.
Chapter 719 also amends §§417.10 and 417.20 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to conform those sections (relating to proof that service of
summons was made inside or outside of this state) to the provisions of
§415.45.
COMMENT
Apparently, Chapter 719 was enacted to extend relief to lessors
and landlords heretofore placed in a difficult position when a tenant unexplainedly leaves the premises. The need for such relief arises almost
exclusively in cases where a commercial tenant unexplainedly leaves
the premises and fails to remove all of his property. In the majority
of such cases, there would seem to be no abandonment technically, so
the lessor or landlord cannot, with impunity, assume possession of the
property. The presence of the tenant's remaining property further
clouds the rights of the parties.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 719, the only available authorized
means of effecting service of summons in such cases was publication
[as authorized by CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §415.50, enacted, CAL.
STATS. 1969, c. 1610, §3, at 3363]. Publication pursuant to §415.50
was required to conform with §6064 of the Government Code (once a
week for four weeks) unless the court, in its discretion, orders publication for a longer period [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §415.50(c),(d)].
Thus a timely resolution of the matter was precluded. Section 415.45,
as added by Chapter 719, is designed to afford the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action an opportunity, through service by posting, to
quickly litigate the dispute.
See Generally:
1) 2 WrrKiN, CALIFOmNA PROCEDURE, Actions §647 (2d ed. 1971).
2) CONTmfunG EDUCATmN OF T=E BAn, RE IEw OF SELECTE 1969 CODE LEGISLATION 67.

Civil Procedure; amended pleadings-time to respond
Code of Civil Procedure §471.5 (repealed); §471.5 (new); §472
(amended).
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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AB 106 (Moorhead); STATs 1972, Ch 73
(Effective July 1, 1972)
Chapter 73 replaces prior §471.5 with a new version and amends
§472 in order to conform time periods provided by the Code of Civil
Procedure for responsive pleading. Section 471.5 now provides that if
the complaint is amended, a copy of the amendments shall be filed,
or the court may, in its discretion, require the complaint as amended to
be filed, and a copy of the amendments or amended complaint must
be served upon the defendants affected thereby. The defendant
shall answer the amendments, or the complaint as amended, within
30 days after service thereof, or such other time as the court may direct,
and judgment by default may be entered upon failure to answer, as in
other cases. For the purposes of this section, "complaint" includes a
cross-complaint, and "defendant" includes a person against whom a
cross-complaint is filed. Section 471.5 further provides that if the
answer is amended, the adverse party has 10 days after service thereof,
or such other time as the court may direct, in which to demur to the
amended answer.
Additionally, Chapter 73 amends §472 by deleting the language of
§472 which conflicted with the 30 day period for answering an amended complaint as provided by §471.5.
COMMENT
In 1969, the period of time in which to respond to all services of
notice of complaint was extended from 10 to 30 days [CAL. CODE
Crv. PRoc. §412.20, CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1610, §3, at 3363]. Following the enactment of §412.20, it was noted by the Code Commissioner that "it has been the universal practice in this state to require an
answer to an amended complaint within the same period of time in
which an original complaint must be answered" [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§432, Code Comm'rs' Notes (West 1954)]. Therefore, §432 (amended complaint; filing; answer) was repealed and §471.5 (amended

complaint; filing; answer) was added [CAL.

STATS.

1971, c. 244,

at 372], extending the time to file an answer to an amended complaint
from 10 days to 30 days following service of notice of such amended

complaint [3 PAc.. L.J.,

REvIEw OF SELECTED

1971 CALIFORNIA LEG-

258 (1972)]. Section 471.5 was to become effective on
July 1, 1972. However, §472 (amendment once of course; time to answer or demur) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that
an adverse party shall have 10 days to answer or demur to any plead-

ISLATION
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ing amended of course, was not revised to conform to the time period
specified in §471.5 and would have been in direct conflict with §471.5

when it became effective

[CAL. STATS.

1972, c. 73, §5].

Therefore, Chapter 73 has been added to the Code of Civil Procedure as an urgency measure to avoid judicial confusion resulting from the
inconsistency between §471.5 and §472 as noted, supra. This chapter is an apparent response to a California Law Revision Commission
Report designed to conform periods of responsive pleading [10 CAL.
LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES,

501 (1971)]. It should be noted that the enacted version of §471.5
provides only for 10 days in which to demur to an amended answer.
This is the same period of time allowed pursuant to §472 prior to the
enactment of Chapter 73.
See Generally:

1)

10 CAL.
(1971).

2)

3 PAc. LJ., REvmw oF SELECTED 1971 CALnomun

LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES,

501

LEISLATON 258 (1972).

Civil Procedure; stay of enforcement of judgment on appeal
Code of Civil Procedure §§917.1, 917.2, 917.5, 917.9 (amended).
SB 908 (Lagomarsino); STATS 1972, Ch 546
Support: State Bar of California
Amends provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to
staying of enforcement of judgments or orders by the perfection of
an appeal; requires an undertaking to be given in specified instances; limits the liability of sureties in designated instances.
Chapter 546 amends four sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
(917.1, 917.2, 917.5 and 917.9) pertaining to staying the enforcement of a judgment or order of the court pending appeal.
Section 917.1 applies to a judgment for money or an order directing
the payment of money and provides that the perfecting of an appeal
shall not stay the enforcement of the judgment or order of the trial
court unless an undertaking is given on condition that if the judgment
or order, or any part of it is affirmed or the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed the party ordered to pay shall pay the amount of the judgment
or order, or the part of it as to which the judgment or order is affirmed. As amended by Chapter 546, §917.1 provides that the party
shall pay the amount of the judgment or order, or the part of it as to
which the judgment or order is affirmed, as entered after the receipt of
the remittitur, together with any interest which may have accrued pending the appeal and entry of the remittitur, and costs which may
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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awarded against the appellant on appeal. Apparently, the addition
of this language to the section states the obligation in a more precise
fashion [Interview with Harold Bradford, Legislative Representative,
State Bar of California, Sacramento, California, Nov. 24, 1972 (hereinafter cited as Bradford)].
Prior to its amendment by Chapter 546, §917.1 stated that the appellants liability shall not exceed the amount of the undertaking given.
Section 917.1 has been amended to clarify that it is only the surety's
liability which is limited by the amount of the undertaking.
Section 917.2 relates to the undertaking to be given to stay the enforcement of a judgment or order directing the assignment or delivery of
personal property, or the sale of personal property upon the foreclosure
of a mortgage or other lien. Prior to its amendment, §917.2 specified that if the property was placed in the custody of an officer designated by the trial court to abide the order of the reviewing court, that
the prefecting of an appeal would stay the enforcement of the judgment or order of the trial court without the necessity of posting bond.
Chapter 546 amends §917.2 to eliminate this alternative to the posting
of an undertaking in order to stay enforcement after perfecting an
appeal. Section 917.2, as amended, however, does permit the court
to consider the fact that the property has been placed in such custody
when fixing the amount of the bond to be required. Section 917.2 is
further amended by Chapter 546 to provide that the undertaking be
given on condition that the appellant or party ordered to assign or deliver the property will obey and satisfy the order of the reviewing court
and will not commit or suffer to be committed any damage to the property, and that if the judgment or order appealed from is affirmed, or
the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed, the appellant shall pay the damage suffered to such property and the value of the use of such property
for the period of the delay caused by the appeal. Prior to amendment, §917.2 provided only that the undertaking be conditioned upon
the appellant's agreement to obey the reviewing court's judgment and
there was no provision relating to the appellant's duty not to commit or
suffer to be committed any damage to the property. By requiring
that the appellant agree to satisfy as well as obey the judgment of the
reviewing court, that portion of §917.2 is clarified in that it now
specifically indicates that if the reviewing court enters a money judgment, appellant shall satisfy such money judgment. Section 917.2 now
clearly indicates that the appellant will be liable for any damages to
the property pending appeal and that should the reviewing court afPacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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firm the judgment or order of the trial court, the appellant shall be liable for the deprivation of use of the property pending appeal. Additionally, §917.2 is amended to provide that if the judgment or order
appealed from directs the sale of perishable property, the trial court
may order such property to be sold and the proceeds thereof to be deposited with the clerk of the trial court to abide the order of the reviewing court and such deposit shall be considered by the court in fixing
the amount of the undertaking. Previous to its amendment, there was
no language indicating that such facts were to be considered in assessing the amount of the bond, thereby rendering §917.2 susceptible to
a construction which would allow the sale and delivery of the proceeds
to the clerk of the trial court to obviate the necessity of posting any
bond whatsoever in order to stay enforcement pending appeal.
Section 917.5 concerns the staying of the enforcement of the judgment or order in the trial court appointing a receiver. Prior to amendment §917.5 stated that an undertaking was required to be given on
condition that if the judgment or order was affirmed or the appeal was
withdrawn or dismissed, the appellant will pay all damages which the respondent may sustain by reason of such stay. Chapter 546 makes a
minor and clarifying amendment to specify that appellant will pay all
damages which the respondent may sustain by reason of such stay in the
enforcement of the judgment.
Section 917.9 pertains to cases not covered by §§917.1 through 917.8
and specifies that the perfecting of an appeal in such cases shall not stay
the enforcement of a judgment or order of the trial court if the court, in
its discretion, requires an undertaking and such undertaking is not
given. Chapter 546 amends §917.9 to provide that any undertaking required by the court in such cases be conditioned upon the performance of the judgment or order appealed from if the same is affirmed
or the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed. Additionally, §917.9 has
been amended to provide that the appellant is liable for all damages
which the respondent may sustain by reason of such stay in the enforcement of the judgment. As amended, §917.9 defines such "damages" as reasonable compensation for the loss of the use of the money
or property. Previously, §917.9 specified that appellant was liable to
respondent for all damages (undefined) he may sustain by the taking of such appeal. Finally, Chapter 546 amends §917.9 to clarify
that it is only the surety's liability which is to be limited by the amount
of the undertaking. This revision will make it clear that the liability
of the surety's principle (the appellant) is not limited by the amount of
the undertaking.
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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COMMENT
In 1968, Title 13 (commencing with §901) of Part 2 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, relating to appeals and stays on appeal, was substantially revised by legislation proposed by the State Bar of California
[See

CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE

BAR, RFvIEw

OF SELECTED

1968 CODE LEGISLATION 70; Bradford]. The revision consisted principally of simplification of the statutes and the elimination of overlapping sections; some substantive changes were made [See 43 CAL.
S.B.J. 742 (1968); 42 CAL. S.B.J. 709 (1967); 41 CAL. S.B.J. 739
(1966); Bradford].
Problems of interpretation and application appear to have arisen
by reason of certain language changes in the 1968 revision of Chapter
2 (commencing with §916), which relates to stays on appeal. Section
917.9, based on former §949 (applicable to superior court), stated
that the perfecting of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judgment or order of the court in cases not provided for in §§917.1 through
917.8, if the trial court, in its discretion, requires an undertaking and
such undertaking is not given. The language of §917.9 substantially
conformed to the pertinent wording of former §949, but did not include
the phrase in former §949 that the undertaking is to "be conditioned
upon the performance of the judgment or order appealed from." In addition, §917.9 specified that the undertaking must provide for payment
of "all damages which the respondent may sustain by the taking of such
appeal."
Because of these and other changes in Chapter 2, it was concluded
in Estate of Murphy [16 Cal. App. 3d 564, 94 Cal. Rptr. 141
(1971)] that the 1968 amendments reflected a legislative intent to
broaden the trial court's authority to require an undertaking as a condition for a stay on appeal; an interpretation not intended nor contemplated by the State Bar of California in sponsoring the 1968 legislation [Bradford]. In Estate of Murphy the trial court, in a proceeding
involving distribution of the corpus of a $2 million trust, had ordered
appellants to file an undertaking of $175,000 as a condition of a stay
pending appeal. Though it does not appear from the Appellate Court's
decision, it is understood that the amount of the required undertaking
was fixed in large part upon the estimated trustee's fees and attorney's
fees to be incurred in connection with the appeal [Bradford]. In
a supersedeas proceeding the appellate court held that the trial court
had properly interpreted its authority under §917.9, and that the
amount of the undertaking was not unreasonable considering the value
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of the trust property. However, after balancing all considerations, the
appellate court determined that the writ of supersedeas should issue.
Therefore, the amendments to §917.9 are in response to the interpretation given that section by the court in Estate of Murphy, and are designed to re-insert the language of former §949 which was deleted in the
1968 adoption of §917.9. The practical effect of adding the requirement that the undertaking be "conditioned upon the performance of the
judgment or order appealed from.. ." is to narrow the scope of §917.9
and to restore its intended recodification of former §949 [Bradford].
It is hoped that the courts will now interpret §917.9 in a similar manner as former §949 [Bradford]. For example, decisions under former
§949 declared the section inapplicable to various types of appeals in
probate proceedings [i.e., Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal. 2d 402, 232 P.2d
481 (1951)]. Similarly, property held by the sheriff in custodia legis,
pending a third party claim proceeding, was held not subject to former
§949 [Jensen v. Hugh B. Evans & Co., 13 Cal. 2d 401, 90 P.2d 72
(1939)].
Section 917.9, as amended by Chapter 546, provides that the appellant will pay all damages which the respondent may sustain by reason of such stay in the enforcement of the judgment. This change is

intended to make it clear that the "damages" that may be awarded
are damages for the loss of the use of the property pending appeal.
In the case of money, the damages would be in the form of interest;
in the case of property, the value of the use -could be awarded. The
word "damages" thus is to be narrowly construed and is not, for example, intended to include attorneys' fees on appeal or damages from
inability to dispose of the property pending appeal [Bradford].
See Generally:
1) 6 WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal §§147-208 (2d ed. 1971).
2)

3)

4)

CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, R VIEW OF SELECTED 1968 CODE LEGISLTIoN 70.
CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE
§§8.1-8.73 (1966).

Rosendahl, The Hidden Persuader,44 CAL. S.B.J. 848 (1969).

Civil Procedure; dismissal of actions
Code of Civil Procedure §583 (amended).
AB 1154 (McAllister); STATS 1972, Ch 1014
Support: State Bar of California
Section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with mandatory
and discretionary dismissal of actions [See 3 PAc. L.., Ravmw oi
Selected 1972 California Legislation

Civil Procedure

SELECTED 1971 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 259 (1972); 2 PAC. L..,
REVIEW OF SELECTED 1970 LEGISLATION 313 (1971)]. Section 583
provides for discretionarydismissal of an action by the court where the
action is not brought to trial within two years after filing; mandatory
dismissal of an action where the action is not brought to trial within
five years after filing (except where the parties have filed a stipulation in
writing that the time may be extended); mandatory dismissal of an
action where it is not brought to trial within three years after an order granting a new trial (except where the parties have filed a stipulation in writing that the time may be extended); and mandatory dismissal of an action where it is not brought to trial within three years
from the filing of remittitur after reversal on appeal.
Chapter 1014 amends §583 to specify that the three year limitation
placed upon bringing an action to trial in cases of an order granting
a new trial and filing of remittitur after reversal on appeal, shall not be
construed to require the dismissal of an action prior to the expiration
of the overall five year period from the date of the original filing of
the action.
Additionally, Chapter 1014 amends §583 to provide that when in any
action a trial has commenced but no judgment has been entered therein
because of a mistrial or because a jury is unable to reach a decision,
mandatory dismissal is required unless the action is brought to trial
within three years after entry of an order by the court declaring the
mistrial or disagreement by the jury (except where the parties have
filed a stipulation in writing that the time may be extended).
COMMENT
It would appear that Chapter 1014 was enacted to preclude the possibility that a plaintiff could be penalized for his diligence. For example, suppose plaintiff brings his case to trial within 1 1/2 years after
filing. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1014, if the case was decided adversely to the plaintiff, and plaintiff's motion for a new trial
was granted, plaintiff would be subject to mandatory dismissal of his
action should he fail to bring the case to trial within three years after
the granting of the motion for new trial.. Thus plaintiff would have 1/2
year less time to bring the action to trial than if he had not been diligent in bringing the action to trial the first time. Section 583, as amended by Chapter 1014, eliminates this inequity by providing that the
three year limitation in such cases does not supersede the overall five
year limitation.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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See Generally:
1) 3 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1971 CAIFORNIA LEGISLATION 259 (1972).
2) 2 PAC. L.J., R EViEW OF SELECTED 1970 CALORN LEGISLATION 317 (1971).

Civil Procedure; libel and slander-continuous publication
Code of Civil Procedure §460.5 (new); §461 (amended).
SB 224 (Deukmejian); STATs 1972, Ch 594
Opposition: California Judicial Council
Section 460.5 has been added to the Code of Civil Procedure to
provide that a court may order that the time to respond to a complaint
in a libel or slander action is 20 days after the service of summons on
the defendant. To secure this order, the plaintiff must file an ex parte
application to show good cause. The application must be supported by
an affidavit stating facts showing, among other things, that the alleged
defamatory matter has been continuously published and that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the publication will continue. The order shall
direct the clerk to endorse the summons to show that the time to respond
has been shortened pursuant to this section, and a copy of the application, affidavit, and order shall be served with the summons. Formerly, the defendant had the normal 30 days to file a responsive pleading
[CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.

§412.20].

This section also provides that in an action for libel or slander the
defendant shall not have more than 10 days to answer an amended complaint, to answer a complaint after his demurrer has been overruled, or
to amend an answer when the plaintiff's demurrer to the answer is sustained [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §586].
The court is also required by this section to give any such action precedence over all other civil actions, except actions to which special preference is given by law. Additionally, the court shall not grant a continuance in excess of 10 days (except for good cause shown) without
consent of the adverse party.
"Continuously published" is defined by this section to mean three or
more publications within 15 days.
Section 461, which allows the defendant, in his answer, to allege
both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating
circumstances, has been amended to make this section applicable to
an action within §460.5.
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Civil Procedure; verified general denial
Code of Civil Procedure §431.40 (amended).
AB 701 (Warren); STATS 1972, Ch 562
Section 431.40 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been amended to
provide that in any action in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
or the value of the property in controversy does not exceed seven hundred fifty dollars ($750), the defendant at his option, in lieu of demurrer or other answer, may file a general written denial verified by his
own oath and a brief statement, similarly verified, of any new matter
constituting a defense.
The maximum amount wherein defendant had the option of filing a
verified general denial was previously $550.
See Generally:

1)

3 PAc. L.J., REvmw OF SELECTED 1971 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 257 (1972).

Civil Procedure; age of majority-pre-existing orders
and instruments
Chapter 1748 of the Statutes of 1971 §§73, 75, 76 (repealed).
AB 587 (Priolo); STATS 1972, Ch 38
(Effective March 28, 1972)
Support: California Banker's Association; State Bar of California;
Superior Court of Los Angeles County
Repeals portions of Chapter 1748 [CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1748,
at 3736] pertaining to: (1) accumulation; and (2) other ages of
majority; provides that all instruments executed prior to the effective date of that Chapter shall be construed by the standard of
majority operative when the instruments were executed; authorizes
possible amendment of those instruments to conform to the revised
age of majority where allowed by law.
Chapter 1748 of the Statutes of 1971 provided that henceforth the
age of majority in California would be 18 years of age. Section 73 of
Chapter 1748 provided that in any order or direction of a court entered
before the operative date of that Chapter (March 4, 1972) except: (1)
orders or directions of a court affecting child support; and (2) where an
intention to the contrary was indicated; a reference to either the age of
majority, 19 years of age, 20 years of age, or 21 years of age, shall
be deemed to be a reference to 18 years of age. Chapter 38 repeals
§73 of Chapter 1748 and provides that the Legislature intends that any
use of, or reference to the words "age of majority," "age of minority,"
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"adult," 'minor," or words of similar intent in any instrument, order,
transfer, or governmental communication whatsoever made in this state:
(a) before the effective date of Chapter 1748 shall make reference to
persons older or younger than 21 years of age; and (b) on or after
the effective date of Chapter 1748 shall make reference to persons older
or younger than 18 years of age.
Chapter 38 also provides that neither Chapter 38 nor Chapter 1748
shall prevent the amendment of any court order, will, trust, contract,
transfer, or instrument to refer to the new 18 year-old age of majority
where such court order, will, trust, contract, transfer, or instrument is:
(1) in existence on the effective date of Chapter 1748; and (2) subject to amendment by law and where amendment is allowable or not
prohibited by the terms thereof; and (3) otherwise subject to the laws
of this state.
Sections 75 (pertaining to periods of accumulation), and 76 (pertaining to ages of majority other than those established by Chapter 1748)
of Chapter 1748 have been deleted.
COMMENT
After the enactment of Chapter 1748, §73 was a source of some confusion in that it became unclear whether "age of majority" should be
construed as meaning 18 or 21 years of age in previously existing

court orders.

Chapter 38 indicates

[CAL. STATS.

1972, c. 38, §31

that it is necessary to inform both the judiciary and the citizens of California that outstanding court orders as of the effective date of Chapter
1748 remain unamended and unaffected by that Act although amendment of such court orders is permissible where amendment is proper in
the discretion of the courts under California law or by the terms of the
court orders themselves. Furthermore, any instrument outstanding on
the effective date of Chapter 1748 may be amended to reflect the new
age of majority if otherwise permissible or not prohibited by law or by the
terms of the instrument.
Civil Procedure; interest on interpleader funds
Code of Civil Procedure §3 86.1 (new).
SB 1158 (Roberti); STATS 1972, Ch 553
Support: State Bar of California
Section 386.1 has been added to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that where a deposit has been made in an action of interpleader, pursuant to Section 386, the court may order such deposit to be invested in
Selected 1972 California Legislation
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an insured, interest bearing account. Interest on such amount shall be
allocated to the parties in the same proportion as the original funds are
allocated.
COMMENT
Prior to the enactment of Section 386.1, it was unclear whether interpleader funds deposited in court pursuant to Section 386 would draw interest. Section 386 provided that any interest on amounts deposited in
court in an interpleader action and any right to damages for detention of property so delivered, or its value, shall cease to accrue after the
date of such deposit or delivery. However, it had been argued that §386,
in terminating the accrual of interest and any right to damages for detention of property in an interpleader proceeding, deals only with the
potential liability between the parties who held the property themselves
and that it does not interfere with the right of the person, ultimately
determined to be entitled to the deposited funds, to interest earned by
such funds when deposited by the county clerk pursuant to Government
Code §§53679 and 68084 [Ostly v. Saper, 147 Cal. App. 2d 671, 675,
305 P.2d 946, 949 (1957); STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1971 CoUNTER-ARGUMENT TO CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 12-23].
Chapter 553
is apparently designed to clarify this uncertainty.
See Generally:
1) STATE BAR op CA.wo1,NIA, 1971 CONEcn RESOLUTION 12-23.

2)

Annot., 15A.L.R. 2d473 (1951).

Civil Procedure; subpoena of medical records
Evidence Code §1563 (amended).
AB 1049 (Warren); STATS 1972, Ch 396
Section 1563 of the Evidence Code has been amended to provide that
when the business records described in a subpoena issued pursuant to
§1560 are patient records of a public or licensed hospital or of a physician and surgeon, osteopath, or dentist licensed to practice in this
state, or a group of such practitioners, and the personal attendance
of the custodian of such records or other qualified witness is not required, the sole fee for compliance with such subpoena is $12.
Additionally, §1563 has been amended to provide that when the
personal attendance of the custodian of a record or other qualified
witness is required pursuant to §1564, he shall be entitled to 20 a mile
for mileage actually traveled, one way only, and to $12 for each day of
actual attendance.
---
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Chapter 396 also makes what appears to be a clarifying change in
the language of §1563. Previously, §1563 specified that article 4
(commencing with §1560) of the Evidence- Code shall not be interpreted to require the tender or payment of more than one witness and
mileage fee or other charge unless there is an agreement to the contrary. As amended by Chapter 396, that portion of §1563 now reads:
". of more than one witness and one mileage fee or other charge.
COMMENT
The production of business records may be compelled by the issuance

of subpoena duces tecum [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§1985, 1987
(c)]. If the custodian of such records or other qualified witness is
required to appear and produce original records pursuant to Evidence
Code §1564, such person receives a $12 per diem witness fee and a
mileage fee [CAL. GOV'T CODE §§68093-68096; CAL. EVID. CODE
§1563(c), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 396, §1]. However,
business records may be subpoenaed without requiring the attendance
of the custodian of such records or other qualified witness [CAL. EvID.
CODE §§1560-1562] and, prior to the enactment of Chapter 396,
there was no statutory authority requiring a specified compensation to
the custodian or business producing such records for expenses incurred
in duplication and delivery. Chapter 396 establishes $12 as the sole
fee payable for compliance with a subpoena of patient records when
the custodian or other qualified witness does not personally appear. This
will apparently: (1) assure some compensation to all specified producers of "patient records"; and (2) prevent such producers from
demanding an amount for duplication and delivery which is greater
than the amount which must be paid for an in-person appearance
and disclosure pursuant to Evidence Code §1563 (c).
The sheer volume of personal injury litigation has necessitated revision
of the law regulating the production of medical records [34 CAL.
S.B.J. 667, 669 (1959); WITICN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Docu-

mentary Evidence §710 (2d ed. 1966); CONTINUING EDUCATION OF
1969 CODE LEGISLATION 112]. However, in 1969, article 4, supra, was revised [CAL. STATS. 1969, c.
199, §2, at 483] to include all business records within its general provisions. Therefore, a suitable subject for further amendment of §1563
might be to also include all business records within the provisions of
that section. Pending such a revision, there will still be no statutory
THE BAR, REvIEw OF SELECTED
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authority regarding compensation for expenses incurred in the duplication and delivery of business records which are not patient records.
See Generally:
1) WrnraN, CAUFORNIA EVIDENCE, Documentary Evidence §710 (2d ed. 1966).
2)

CONTINUNo EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1969 CODE LEOISLATIo7 112.

3)

34 CAL. S.B.J. 667 (1969).

Civil Procedure; bank accounts-adverse claimants
Financial Code §952 (repealed); §952 (new).
SB 979 (Song); STATS 1972, Ch 548
Provides that a bank shall, rather than may, disregardnotice of
an adverse claim to a deposit or personal property held by that
bank unless a specified court order or affidavit is delivered to or
served on the bank by the adverse claimant; provides that a bank
shall not refuse delivery of a deposit or property for more than
three court days (including the day of delivery) on the basis of the
affidavit of an adverse claimant.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 548, §952 of the Financial Code
provided that a bank may disregard notice of an adverse claim to a
deposit or personal property held by that bank unless a court order,
or bond is served on or delivered to the bank, in which case the bank
shall "freeze" such funds and/or such property. Section 952 further
provided that upon the adverse claimant's filing of an affidavit, as specified, the bank may "freeze" deposits and/or property until the adverse
claim is adjudicated or released.
Chapter 548 has repealed §952 and added a revised §952 to provide that notice to any bank of an adverse claim to a deposit standing
on its books to the credit of, or to personal property held for the account of any person shall be disregarded, and the bank, notwithstanding such notice, shall honor the checks, notes, or other instruments
requiring payment of money by or for the account of the person to
whose credit the account stands and on demand shall deliver any such
property to, or on the order of, the person for whose account such property is held, without any liability on the part of the bank; subject,
however, to the exceptions provided in §952(a) and (b).
Section 952(a) provides that if an adverse claimant delivers to the
bank, at the office at which the deposit is carried or at which the property is held, his affidavit stating that of his own knowledge the person
to whose credit the deposit stands, or for whose account the property is held, is a fiduciary for the adverse claimant and that he has reaPacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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son to believe such fiduciary is about to misappropriate the deposit
or the property, and stating the facts on which such claim of fiduciary relationship and such belief are founded, the bank shall refuse
payment of the deposit and shall refuse to deliver such property for a
period of not more than three court days (including the day of delivery)
from the date that the bank received the adverse claimant's affidavit,
without liability on its part and without liability for the sufficiency
or truth of the facts alleged in the affidavit.
Section 952(b) provides that if at any time, either before, after,
or in the absence of the filing of an affidavit by the adverse claimant,
such adverse claimant procures and serves upon the bank, at the office at which the deposit is carried or at which the property is held, a
restraining order, injunction, or other appropriate order against the
bank from a court of competent jurisdiction in an action in which the adverse claimant and all persons in whose names such deposit stands or for
whose account such property is held are parties, the bank shall comply with such order or injunction, without liability on its part.
Section 952(c) specifies that the provisions of §952 shall be applicable even though the name of the person appearing on the bank's books
to whose credit the deposit stands or for whose account the property is
held is modified by a qualifying or descriptive term such as "agent,"
"trustee," or other word or phrase indicating that such person may not
be the owner in his own right of the deposit or property.
COMMENT
In addition to stating the bank's duty to disregard specified adverse
claims in mandatory terms, Chapter 548 also: (1) eliminates the bonding option previously allowed an adverse claimant under former §952
[See CONTINUING
LECTION

EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DEBT COL-

PRACTICE §10.16 (Supp. 1972)]; and (2) limits to three

days the amount of time a bank shall "freeze," without judicial process,
the account or property of a depositor who is alleged to be a fiduciary
of an adverse claimant.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 548, a bank was permitted, upon
receipt of an affidavit, as specified, to withhold the accounts or property of such a depositor until the adverse claim was finally adjudicated
or released. However, such a provision was of doubtful constitutionality
in light of the recent decisions in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.
[395 U.S. 337 (1969)], McCallop v. Carberry [1 Cal. 3d 903, 464
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P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970)], and Randone v. Appellate Department [5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971)
(hereinafter cited as Randone)]. These decisions have held that attachment or garnishment of a person's property prior to notice and a judicial hearing is a violation of procedural due process and therefore
unconstitutional except in "extraordinary circumstances" [Randone, at
541, 488 P.2d at 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 711; see STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1970 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 9-7; Jackson, Attachment In
California-WhatNow?, 3 PAC. L.J. 1, 11, 12 (1972) ].
Pursuant to Chapter 548, an adverse claimant who desires to freeze
the bank account or property held in the name of his alleged fiduciary
for longer than three days will be required to obtain a court order. The
three-day freeze based on an affidavit alone was intended to permit the
adverse claimant to preserve the status quo for a limited period while
filing an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain temporary
relief [Interview with Harold Bradford, Legislative Representative,
State Bar of California, Sacramento, California, July 26, 1972 (hereinafter cited as Bradford)].
The Legislature's choice of a three-day period appears to be an attempt to strike a proper constitutional balance between affording the
adverse claimant temporary relief in narrowly defined instances and insuring the property owner of procedural due process. The proponents of Chapter 548 maintain that the "minimal" three-day provision, combined with the strict affidavit requirements will not constitute
a deprivation of a "significant property interest" [Randone, at 541, 464
P.2d at 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 711] within the perview of Randone, Sniadach, or McCallop [Bradford]. It should be noted that a deposit or
property held in the name of one not alleged to be a fiduciary of the
adverse claimant is not subject to the specified affidavit procedure
and thus may not be "frozen" pursuant to §952 without resort to the
judicial process.
Chapter 548 also permits the adverse claimant who is filing an affidavit with the bank to aver that he has reason to believe that the fiduciary is about to misappropriate the deposit or property. Prior to the
enactment of Chapter 548, the adverse claimant had to aver that the
fiduciary was about to misappropriate the deposit or property.
A significant practical effect of Chapter 548 is the protection afforded a bank from the burden of having to itself determine the merits
of conflicting claims, or, in the alternative, to bring an action in interpleader [Bradford]. In addition, §952, as adopted by Chapter 548,
Pacific Law lournal Vol. 4

Civil Procedure
grants further statutory relief to banks from any general duty to police
fiduciary accounts-a burden which they "could not reasonably be expected to carry out effectively" [Desert Bermuda Properties v. Union
Bank, 265 Cal. App. 2d 146, 151, 152, 71 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (1968)].
See Generally:
1) Jackson, Attachment in California-WhatNow?, 3 PAC. L.J. 1 (1972).
2) Comment, Attachment in California: A New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 1254 (1970).
3) Comment, Attachment in California: A Solution to the Effect of Sniadach, 1
PAC. L.J. 304 (1970).
4) Comment, Some Implicationsof Snidach, 70 COLUM. L. Rlv. 942 (1970).
5) Recent Cases, 5 CEiHTON L. REv. 176 (1971).

Civil Procedure; confidential communications
Evidence Code §1010 (amended).
SB 402 (Deukmejian); STATS 1972, Ch 888
Support: California State Marriage Counseling Association; Board
of Behaviorial Science Examiners; Department of Professional and
Vocational Standards
Section 1010 of the Evidence Code has been amended to include licensed marriage, family and child counselors within the definition of a
psychotherapist for purposes of the Evidence Code. Confidential communications between a psychotherapist and his patient are privileged
[See CAL. EvID. CODE §1010 et seq.]; however, pursuant to §1028,
the marriage, family, and child counselors privilege as a psychotherapist does not apply in criminal proceedings.
It is noteworthy that §1027 declares that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is nonexistent if the patient is a child under the age of
sixteen.
Civil Procedure; spouse of judgment debtorprivilege not to testify
Code of Civil Procedure §717 (amended).
SB 1429 (Holmdahl); STATS 1972, Ch 619
Pursuant to §717 of the Code of Civil Procedure, after issuance or
return of an execution against property of the judgment debtor, and
upon proof by affidavit or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the judge,
that any person or corporation has property of the judgment debtor, or
is indebted to him in an amount exceeding $50, the judge may by order,
require such person or corporation to appear and answer concerning
the matter.
Selected 1972 California Legislation

Civil Procedure

Chapter 619 amends §717 to provide that the spouse of the judgment debtor cannot be compelled to testify in a post-judgment hearing
authorized by §717. The spouse may only invoke the privilege to the
extent permitted by §§970 and 971 of the Evidence Code, and the privilege will not apply if there has been a waiver of the provisions of §§970
and 971 in the action giving rise to the judgment.
Section 970 of the Evidence Code states that "except as otherwise
provided by statute, a married person has a privilege not to testify
against his spouse in any proceeding." Section 971 provides that a married person whose spouse is a party to a proceeding has a privilege not
to be called as a witness by an adverse party to that proceeding without
the prior express consent of the spouse so privileged or unless the party
calling the spouse does so in good faith without knowledge of the marital relationship.
COMMENT

Since §§970 and 971 of the Evidence Code extend to a married person a privilege not to testify against his spouse in any proceeding, the
apparent effect of Chapter 619 is to simply declare that a post-judgment hearing authorized by §717 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a
proceeding within the meaning of §§970 and 971 of the Evidence
Code. However, it should be noted that a waiver of the privilege in
the action giving rise to the judgment also constitutes a waiver in the
§717 actions.
See Generally:

1)
2)
3)
4)

5 WrTIN, CALIFORMNA PRocEDuRE, Enforcement of Judgment §§125-26 (2d
ed. 1971).
WMNm, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Witnesses §§828-36 (2d ed. 1966).
McDonough, CaliforniaEvidence Code: Privileges, 18 HAST. L.J. 106 (1966).
Leighton, Supplementary Proceeding and Creditors' Claims under California Procedure, 14 HAST. L.J. 17 (1962).

Civil Procedure; mechanic's liens-union trust funds
Civil Code §3111.5 (new).
SB 957 (Coombs); STATS 1972, Ch 609
Chapter 609 adds §3111.5 to the Civil Code to require employees'
trust funds, established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement to
which payments are required to be made on account of fringe benefits
supplemental to a wage agreement for the benefit of a claimant on
particular real property [CAL. CIV. CODE §3111], to give a subcontractor upon his demand, the statement described below. Within five
326
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days of receipt of a demand by a subcontractor, the union trust fund
shall provide a written statement which contains the following information: (1) the subcontractor's payments to the fund for supplemental
fringe benefits during the preceding 12 months; (2) the fact, if such be
the case, that the trust fund has no information or belief that the subcontractor is further indebted to the trust fund for those months.
Section 3111.5(b) provides that the statement of the trust fund provided to satisfy any creditor of the subcontractor that he is not further indebted to the trust fund, is made without prejudice to the trust
fund.
COMMENT
Existing law grants a lien to union fringe benefit trust funds for the
payment of amounts established pursuant to collective bargaining agreements [CAL. CIV. CODE §3109 et seq.]. Because of this lien, construction lenders are apparently reluctant to issue progress payments absent a release by the trust fund. This bill enables the subcontractor to
provide his contractor with a statement by the trust fund which
states his outstanding obligation, if any, to the fund.
See Generally:
1)

CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA MECHANiCS LIENS AND OTHER
REMEDIES, §§1.13 et seq., 3.9-3.10, 4.11 et seq., 5.3 et seq., 6.5, 7.25, 7.6, 7.8

(1972).

Civil Procedure; destruction of court records
Government Code §§69503.2, 69503.3 (new); 69503.1 (amended).
AB 2349 (Moorhead); STATS 1972, Ch 866
Support: Los Angeles County Clerk
Section 69503.1 of the Government Code provides for the destruction
of records, papers, and exhibits in any superior court action or proceeding after 30 years have elapsed since the filing of any paper in the
action or proceeding. This section has been amended to include case
files within the records which may be destroyed. Chapter 866
also amends this section to provide that case files of civil actions which
have been dismissed may be destroyed seven years after dismissal, and
case files of civil actions for tortious injury to the person or for wrongful death, which have not been dismissed, may be destroyed 15
years after final judgment, with the exception of those cases which
involve a petition filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §372 (actions against insane or incompetent persons), cases in which an action
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is pending or under appeal, cases in which the time to enforce the judgfent has been extended, or cases in which there is pending a motion
filed pursuant to §685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (execution of
judgment after the lapse of 10 years from the date of its entry). This
section does not apply to the records of probate, real property, juvenile,
criminal, or adoption actions or proceedings.
Section 69503.2 has been added to the Government Code to require
the county clerk to defer the disposal of the case file of a civil action
or proceeding five years beyond the retention period specified in
§69503.1, upon the receipt of a written request from a party or his attorney. During such time the clerk, upon request and payment of a
fee, shall provide copies of such case file.
Section 69503.3 has been added to the Government Code to provide
that documents destroyed pursuant to §69503.1 may be proved by a copy
authenticated pursuant to Division 11 (commencing with §1400) of
the Evidence Code.
Civil Procedure; witnesses-vehicle inspection specialists
Government Code §68097 (amended).
SB 155 (Lagomarsino); STATS 1972, Ch 256
Support: California Highway Patrol
Section 68097 of the Government Code has been amended to include vehicle inspection specialists of the California Highway Patrol
[CAL. VEHCLE CODE §§2251, 34500 et seq.] within the definition of
the term "member of the California Highway Patrol" for the purposes of
this section and Government Code §§68097.1-68097.10. Section
68097 contains provisions for the payment of witnesses' fees and mileage
in civil cases, and refers to separate procedures for payment of members of the California Highway Patrol, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, marshals, deputy marshals, and city policemen, which are contained in
§68097.1 et seq.
When a member of the California Highway Patrol (e.g., vehicle
inspection specialist) is to serve as a witness in a civil case, advance
payment of $45 per day (for reimbursement of the public entity) must
be made, by the person at whose request the subpoena is issued, to the
clerk of the court or with the tribunal prior to the issuance of the subpoena; the witness receives from the California Highway Patrol his
normal salary and the actual necessary and reasonable traveling expenses incurred by him in complying with the subpoena [§68097.2].
Prior to amendment of §68097, the California Highway Patrol incurred
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 4
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the expense when a motor vehicle inspection specialist was subpoened
to testify as a witness in a civil case.
Sections 68097.1, 68097.5, 68097.55, 68097.6 and 68097.9 concern subpoena procedures required for the witness to appear and provisions for payment for extra days the witness is needed.
In addition, it is now a misdemeanor to offer a vehicle inspection
specialist payment for his testimony in excess of that specified [CAL.
GOV'T CODE §68097.7]. It is also a misdemeanor for such witness
to ask for or receive money or consideration in excess of that provided
by §§68097.2 and 68097.4.
See Generally:

1)

CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§394, 1989, 2064.

2)
3)
4)

CAl.. Gov'T CODE §68097.1 et seq.
CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§2251, 34500 et seq.
WrriaN, CAL OFNA EvIDENcE, Witnesses §748 et seq. (2d ed. 1966),

(Supp.

1969).
5)

CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALnioRNrA CiviL PROCUURE DURING TRIAL,
Compelling Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Documentary and Real

Evidence §3.2 et seq. (1960).

Civil Procedure; reimbursement for appointed counsel
Government Code §27712 (new); §27706 (amended).
SB 647 (Lagomarsino); STATS 1972, Ch 661
Support: Count Supervisors Association
Section 27706 of the Government Code prescribes the duties of the
public defender as "the representation of any person not financially
able to employ counsel" in specified litigation. Chapter 661 amends
§27706 to provide that any person represented by the public defender
is subject to §987.8 of the Penal Code, which requires the court, at the
termination of a criminal trial, to determine the present ability of the
defendant to pay for all or part of the cost of counsel and to order
payment in appropriate cases.
Section 27712 has been added to reiterate the language of Penal Code
§987.8 with sufficient changes to make the section applicable in any
case in which a party is furnished counsel, either through the public
defender or private counsel appointed by the court, and with an addition which directs the court to adjudge a standard by which to measure the cost of counsel and requires appointed counsel to provide evidence of services performed, pursuant to such standard.
COMMENT

The enactment of §27712 is an apparent attempt to specify that the
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reimbursement provision be extended to all cases in which representation is through appointed counsel. It was therefore appropriate that
it be included in the Government Code chapter concerning the public
defender. However, in light of the addition of §27712, the amendment
of §27706, directing the public defender to apply the reimbursement
provision of Penal Code §987.8, appears redundant.
Government Code §27706 limits qualification for the services of the
public defender to persons not financially able to employ counsel. Thus,
a preliminary determination of inability to pay is necessary before a public defender can even accept a case. In most criminal cases, an incourt statement of the party would appear sufficient [See CAL. PEN.
CODE §987] and this would also appear to be sufficient in appropriate
civil cases [See CAL. GOV'T CODE §27706(b), (c), (d), (e)]. The
preliminary determination is made by the court in which the proceeding
is pending [CAL. GOV'T CODE §27707]. Section 27712 specifies who,
for reimbursement purposes, will determine qualification standards and
whether a person meets those standards (the court), and when the
determination will take place (at the conclusion of proceedings in the
trial court). Each recipient of the services of the public defender is
thus subject to dual scrutiny to determine financial eligibility [See
3 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1971 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION

318 (1972)].
The requirement for reimbursement in both Penal Code §987.8 and
Government Code §27712 appears vulnerable to attack as unconstitutional on three possible grounds. First, California courts have indicated that a statute which discourages a defendant from accepting the
offer of counsel is an unconstitutional "chilr on the right to counsel
guaranteed by article 1, §13 of the California Constitution, Sections
858 (n) and 859 of the Penal Code, and the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, made obligatory upon the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment [See In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 468
P.2d 204, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1970); In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 455
P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969)]. Secondly, these sections arguably violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A party whose ability to pay is marginal, is more likely to
waive counsel than those who clearly can or cannot afford counsel.
Thus, a classification is created which discriminates on the basis of
wealth, in situations in which substantial rights of the party are at
stake.
The final possible ground for unconstitutionality is that the statute
may violate the due process provisions of the California and United
330
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States Constitutions. The due process argument is that the lack of specific guidelines for determination of inability to employ counsel and
the lack of a provision for a hearing or appeal from the court's determination can deprive a party of a significant property interest without due
process of law [See Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488
P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337 (1969); In re Allen, supra].
Civil Procedure; actions against sureties
Civil Code §2845 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure §1058a
(new).

AB 605 (Warren);

STATS

1972, Ch 391

Authorizes and specifies procedure for notice to and recovery
against surety without independent action.
Section 1058a has been added to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that whenever any security is given in the form of a bond or undertaking, in any action or proceeding, each surety submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court in all matters affecting his liability on the
bond or undertaking.
After entry of the final judgment in the action or proceeding for
which the bond or undertaking is given and the time for appeal has expired, the liability of the surety or sureties, if any, may be enforced
on motion filed in the trial court without the necessity of an independent action. Further, § 1058a requires that notice of the motion be served
on the surety whose liability is sought to be enforced at least 30 days
prior to the time set for hearing of the motion. Judgment against the
surety may then be entered unless the surety serves and files an affidavit
in opposition to the motion showing facts as may be deemed by the
judge hearing the motion sufficient to present a triable issue of fact.
If such a showing is made by the surety, the issues to be tried shall be
specified by the court and trial thereof shall be set for the earliest date
convenient to the court, allowing sufficient time for discovery.
Under the provisions of § 1058a the surety cannot obtain a stay of proceedings pending the determination of any third party claims.
It should be noted that §1058a has no application in cases of a bond
or undertaking of a public officer or fiduciary.
In addition, Chapter 391 amends §2845 of the Civil Code to make
that section subject to the provisions of §1058a of the Code of Civil Procedure, as added by Chapter 391. Section 2845 deals with the right of
a surety to require his creditor to proceed against the principal.
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COMMENT
Because of the potentiality of abuse of extraordinary remedies and
procedures in civil actions, California, by statute, requires the posting
of security before the remedies or procedures vll issue. For example, security is specifically required for attachment [CAL. CODE CIV.
PRoc. §539(a), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §14], claim
and delivery [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §511(b), enacted, CAL. STATS.
1972, c. 855, §2], and injunctive relief [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §529].
The bond or undertaking posted as security is designed to operate as
a readily available means to compensate the aggrieved party in the
event the extraordinary remedy or procedure is inappropriately issued.
However, prior to the enactment of Chapter 391, with the exception of
§535 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which provides for recovery upon
the security without the necessity of an independent action in cases of
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions), the aggrieved
party had no swift and inexpensive means to reach the security [Bezaire v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 12 Cal. App. 3d 888, 91 Cal. Rptr.
142 (1970). Independent action against the surety was necessary
to recover upon the bond or undertaking for damages sustained as a
result of the inappropriate issuance of the remedy.
Section 1058a, as added by Chapter 391, relieves the aggrieved
party of the necessity of instituting a new proceeding in order to take
advantage of security originally posted for his benefit. That relief is in
the form of an ancillary hearing between the aggrieved party and the
surety. Section 1058a is patterned after the provisions of §535 of the
Code of Civil Procedure [supra] and the Federal Judicial Code [FED.
R. Civ. P. 65.1 (providing for recovery against surety without independent action in federal courts)].
'In addition to lessening the burden of recovery to the aggrieved party,
it appears that §1058a will have the practical effect of making sureties
more selective of their principals and more interested in the progress
of the litigation.
See Generally:
1)

CAL. CODE Civ. PROc. §535.

2)
3)

FED. R. Civ. P. 65.1,28 U.S.C. Rule 65.1.
Bezaire v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 12 Cal. App. 3d 888, 91 Cal. Rptr. 142
(1970).

Civil Procedure; interpreters
Government Code § 11513 (amended).
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AB 1557 (Z'Berg);

STATS

1972, Ch 1390

Support: State Bar of California
Government Code §11513, dealing with administrative hearings,
has been amended to provide that the proponent of any testimony to
be offered by a witness who does not proficiently speak English, shall
provide an interpreter, approved by the hearing officer conducting the
proceedings. The cost of the interpreter shall be paid by the agency
having jurisdiction over the matter if the hearing officer so directs,
otherwise by the party providing the interpreter. This section has been
further amended to authorize the Office Of Administrative Hearings to
compile and publish a list of interpreters, and any person whose name
appears on the list shall be deemed to be approved by the hearing officer hearing the case.
See Generally:

1)
2)

Molinar, Administrative Process and Due Process, A Synthesis Updated, 10

SANTA

CLARA LAW. 274 (1970).
STATE BAR OF CALonRNmA, 1972 CONFERENCE RESOLuTION 12-24.

Civil Procedure; coordination of civil actions
Code of Civil Procedure § §404-404.8 (new).
AB 930 (Warren); STATS 1972, Ch 1162
(Effective January 1, 1974)
Provides a method for combining civil actions which are pending
in different courts.
Section 404 provides that when civil actions sharing a common question of fact or law are pending in different courts, the presiding judge
of any such court (on his own motion or on the motion of any party
supported by an affidavit stating facts showing that the actions meet
the standards specified in §404.1 infra), or all the parties plaintiff or
defendant in such action, supported also by the above-mentioned affidavit, may request the Chairman of the Judicial Council to assign a
judge to determine whether coordination of the actions is appropriate.
Section 404.1 states that such coordination is appropriate if one
judge hearing all of the actions for all purposes in a selected site or
sites will promote the ends of justice, taking into account:
(1) Whether the common question of fact or law is predominating
and significant to the litigation;
(2) The convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel;
(3) The relative development of the actions and the work product
of counsel;
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(4) The efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower;
(5) The calendar of the courts;
(6) The disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and
(7) The likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.
Section 404.2 provides that if the assigned judge determines coordination to be appropriate, he shall select the reviewing court having
appellate jurisdiction, if the actions to be coordinated are within the
jurisdiction of more than one reviewing court. Such determination
shall be based on the standards set forth in §404.1.
Section 404.3 empowers the assigned judge to order that the actions
be coordinated and provides that the Chairman of the Judicial Council shall assign a judge to hear and determine the actions in the site
the assigned judge finds appropriate.
Section 404.4 allows the presiding judge of any court in which
there is an action pending which shares a common question of fact or
law with an already coordinated action, to request the judge in the
coordinated action to issue an order to combine both actions. Such
request may be based on the judge's motion or on the motion of any
party supported by affidavit. Coordination of such action shall be determined by the standards specified in §404.1.
Pursuant to §404.5, the judge making the coordination determination may stay any action being considered for, or affecting an action
being considered for coordination.
Section 404.6 provides that within 10 days after service upon him of
notice of entry of an order made pursuant to Chapter 1162, any party
may petition the appropriate reviewing court for a writ of mandate to
require the court to make such order as the reviewing court finds appropriate.
Section 404.7 provides that the practice and procedure for coordination of civil actions, including provision for giving notice and presenting evidence, are to be established by rule of the Judicial Council.
Section 404.8 provides that certain expenses of coordination are to be
paid by the state from funds appropriated to the Judicial Council.
See Generally:
1) 3 WnImN, CALro

PROCEDURE, Pleading §§254-265 (2d ed. 1971).
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